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This Article discusses the impact of the international financial crisis 
on Brazilian capital markets. While the banking industry was not 
severely affected, leading nonfinancial corporations experienced 
severe financial turmoil. Two Brazilian corporations cross-listed in 
the United States — Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose S.A. — suffered 
billion-dollar losses when the Brazilian real unexpectedly plummeted 
in relation to the dollar. Despite earlier disclosure that these companies 
had engaged only in pure hedging activity, these great losses were 
found to be the result of their highly speculative trading in currency 
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derivatives. Consequently, several private lawsuits were filed both 
in the United States and in Brazil. 
 This Article takes a novel approach to the transnational securities 
litigation debate by examining the particular consequences of private 
litigation in a developed and in an emerging country. It compares the 
types of lawsuits filed and their final outcomes. Despite substantially 
similar alleged wrongdoing, the outcomes for securities holders in each 
jurisdiction contrast strikingly. Only U.S. investors of both companies 
were able to obtain substantial financial recoveries; Brazilian 
investors obtained none. This Article examines the reasons behind 
these discrepant results and the consequent economic distributional 
effects on global securities markets after the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Morrison. 
 The Article argues that Morrison aggravates such (i) shareholder 
cross-border non pro rata compensation and (ii) transfers of company 
value from foreign to U.S. investors. It identifies a set of costs borne by 
foreign investors, and so far neglected by scholars, as a consequence 
of the current status of U.S. and international securities law regimes. 
These costs are the result not only of the typical “circularity problem” 
in securities litigation, but also of a “double circularity problem” 
as they fall on foreign shareholders who also suffered equivalent 
damages to those experienced by the U.S. class being compensated. The 
Article then discusses potential policy reforms for fixing transnational 
securities litigation.
IntroductIon
The most recent international financial crisis has generated a vast academic 
literature. Scholars have extensively analyzed the causes of the crisis and 
its effects on financial markets and regulation.1 Researchers have devoted 
1 See, e.g., RichaRd a. PosneR, a FailuRe oF caPitalism: the cRisis oF ’08 and 
the descent into dePRession (2009); RobeRt J. shilleR, subPRime solution: 
how today’s Global Financial cRisis haPPened and what to do about it 
(2008); RobeRt J. shilleR & Randall KRoszneR, ReFoRminG us Financial 
maRKets: ReFlections beFoRe and beyond dodd-FRanK (2011); Roberta Romano, 
Regulating in the Dark, in ReGulatoRy bReaKdown: the cRisis oF conFidence 
in u.s. ReGulation 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); Roberta Romano, For 
Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing 
and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture (Yale Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 452, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127749.
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special attention to how the corporate governance practices of financial 
institutions influenced the crisis,2 and to corporate governance reforms in 
post-crisis regulation.3 However, much less attention has been paid to how 
the financial crisis affected the performance of nonfinancial firms and their 
corporate governance practices around the world.4
This Article contributes to filling this gap. It analyzes how the financial 
crisis affected large nonfinancial firms in Brazil. This is a valuable inquiry 
because of the peculiarities of the Brazilian financial and capital markets 
and the distinctive consequences brought by the crisis. First, the Brazilian 
banking industry — when compared to that of other countries — was not 
severely affected by the international financial crisis, largely as a result of 
its conservative financial practices.5 Second, the international financial crisis 
burst in 2008, immediately after the booming capital market years of Novo 
Mercado in 2006 and 2007.6 Because it generated a strong shock for capital 
2 See, e.g., David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung & Pedro Matos, Corporate Governance in 
the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, 
18 J. coRP. Fin. 389 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 minn. l. Rev. 1779 (2011); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank (UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ. Working Paper No. 10-14, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1698898.
4 See, e.g., Kartick Gupta, Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti & Alireza Tourani-Rad, 
Is Corporate Governance Relevant During the Financial Crisis?, 23 J. int’l 
Fin. mKt. institutions & money 85 (2013) (finding a lack of impact of internal 
corporate governance quality on the performance of a large sample of nonfinancial 
publicly held companies during the financial crisis). In contrast, this Article will 
explore case studies in which flaws of internal corporate governance quality 
during the crisis produced strongly negative performances. 
5 See generally Enrique R. Carrasco & Sean Williams, Emerging Economies After 
the Global Financial Crisis: The Case of Brazil, 33 nw. J. int’l l. & bus. 81 
(2012) (arguing that in general “[e]merging economies have rebounded relatively 
quickly from the 2008 global financial crisis”). A few medium Brazilian banks 
suffered from liquidity problems, and were acquired by larger banks.
6 Novo Mercado is a special listing segment of the largest Brazilian stock exchange, 
BM&FBovespa. In 2000, BM&FBovespa created three listing segments — Novo 
Mercado, Level 2, and Level 1 — to which firms can voluntarily migrate. To 
list in these segments, firms have to comply with stricter standards of corporate 
governance than those determined by Brazilian corporate law. Novo Mercado 
adopts the most stringent rules, followed by Level 2 and Level 1. The previously 
existing traditional market requires no additional compliance beyond state law. 
The success of these new listing markets has attracted a lot of media and academic 
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markets around the world, there was a lot of speculation as to whether Novo 
Mercado would pass it unscathed. To be sure, the activity of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in the Brazilian market was affected by the crisis. IPO 
activity significantly decreased in 2008 and 2009, recovered slightly in 2010 
and 2011, but diminished again in 2012 and 2013.7 While there is a paucity of 
work on the impact of the crisis on Brazilian capital markets, a recent study 
analyzing 2013 data from corporate ownership structures shows that the 
greater ownership dispersion achieved by Novo Mercado firms has largely 
remained stable at pre-crisis numbers.8 
The direct impact of the international crisis on Brazil therefore seemed 
less pronounced than the acute financial woes experienced in other markets 
and aggravated by the European crisis.9 Yet, by looking at aggregate financial 
attention. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, 
Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, 
the United States, and the European Union, 63 stan. l. Rev. 475 (2013); Érica 
Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated Towards 
Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging 
Countries, 29 nw. J. int’l l. & bus. 439 (2009); Bernard S. Black, Antonio 
Gledson de Carvalho & Joelson Oliveira Sampaio, The Evolution of Corporate 
Governance in Brazil (Nw. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 12-22, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181039.
7 See data from Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), the Brazilian Securities 
and Exchange Commission. This decrease in IPO numbers cannot be exclusively 
attributed to the financial crisis, as it can also be explained by other shortcomings 
of Brazil’s economy and capital markets. 
8 Because the crisis caused securities prices to significantly drop, one could 
hypothesize that former controlling shareholders — who sold shares for high 
prices at IPOs or secondary offerings — and other investors could cheaply 
acquire shares at a discount in the secondary market and gain corporate control 
in order to extract private benefits. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection 
Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7203. However, data show this was not the case. See Érica Gorga, Corporate 
Control & Governance after a Decade from “Novo Mercado”: Changes in 
Ownership Structures and Shareholder Power in Brazil, in ReseaRch handbooK 
on shaReholdeR PoweR (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 
2015).
9 See generally Ryan Avent, The Euro Crisis: The New European Union, economist, 
Dec. 16, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/euro-crisis; 
Mark Landler, The U.S. Financial Crisis Is Spreading to Europe, n.y. times, Sept. 
30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/business/worldbusiness/01global.
html?_r=0; Bill Marsh, It’s All Connected: A Spectator’s Guide to the Euro Crisis, 
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numbers, one might underestimate the impact of the international crisis on 
Brazil’s capital markets and corporate governance practices. In spite of the 
trivial decline in securities prices (as experienced in virtually every stock 
market), an unexpected development followed. 
Two leading Brazilian corporations — Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose 
S.A. — suffered billion-dollar losses when the Brazilian real unexpectedly 
plummeted in relation to the dollar, causing severe financial turmoil.10 These 
nonfinancial companies had previously disclosed that they followed conservative 
financial policies and relied on hedging instruments to manage risk exposure 
to exchange rate fluctuations as part of their normal international commercial 
activities. However, their actual losses were far greater than what would have 
been expected from pure hedging activity protecting the revenues of core 
business operations. Instead, the sudden losses were found to be the result of 
the companies’ highly speculative trading in the currency derivatives futures 
markets.11 These developments were largely exposed in media cover stories, 
prompting strong criticisms by market players and politicians, including the 
Brazilian president at the time.12
n.y. times, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2011/10/22/
opinion/20111023_DATAPOINTS.html?ref=sunday-review; Jonathan Davis, One 
of the Worst Handled Crises Ever, Fin. times oPinion bloG (May 20, 2012, 4:28 
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef9cb1f4-a030-11e1-90f3-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=intl#axzz2pAlSJ8FL.
10 Commentators pointed out that many other Brazilian companies also suffered 
losses with currency exchange derivatives. In this Article I focus only on the 
two most egregious and widely discussed cases. See infra note 39.
11 The Brazilian firms therefore contradicted academic findings for a sample of 
U.S. nonfinancial firms. See Wayne Guay & S.P. Kothari, How Much Do Firms 
Hedge with Derivatives?, 70 J. Fin. econ. 423 (2003) (“Corporate derivatives 
use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile.”); see 
also Ludger Hentschel & S.P. Kothari, Are Corporations Reducing or Taking 
Risks with Derivatives?, 36 J. Fin. & Quantitative analysis 93 (2001). For a 
recent critique of the the Dodd-Frank Act’s financial regulation, see Gina-Gail 
S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with 
Credit Derivatives, 33 Rev. banKinG & Fin. l. 813 (2014).
12 Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared: “The companies that 
bet and lost will have to face up to their responsibilities.” Antonio Regalado, 
Big Currency Bets Backfire, wall st. J., Oct. 22, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB122463251866656551. He also affirmed that “[i]t was not 
because of the crisis, but because of speculation. They were speculating against 
the Brazilian currency. They were practicing, through greed, speculation that 
is in no way recommendable.” Lula acusa Aracruz e Sadia de especulação 
gananciosa [Lula Accuses Aracruz and Sadia of Greedy Speculation], estadão, 
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Consequently, several private suits were filed both in the United States and 
in Brazil. U.S. lawyers filed federal class actions in New York and Florida on 
behalf of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) holders, claiming securities 
fraud on the grounds that the companies were heavily speculating in currency 
rates in amounts that largely exceeded any prudent hedging. In shareholder 
meetings, Brazilian shareholders authorized the corporations to file “derivative” 
lawsuits against former Chief Financial Officers in São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro.13
In this Article, I take a novel approach to the transnational securities litigation 
debate by examining the particular consequences of private litigation in the 
United States and in Brazil. I focus on the distinct private enforcement actions 
taken in a developed and in an emerging country against both companies and 
their managers. The settlement hearings for the Sadia and Aracruz cases have 
recently been conducted in the United States,14 and the legal actions in Brazil 
have also concluded. Therefore, I am able to compare their legal nature and 
developments, as well as their final outcomes.
While the alleged wrongdoings were generally the same, similarly affecting 
American and Brazilian securities holders of Sadia and Aracruz, the legal 
mechanisms available for investor protection and their outcomes were strikingly 
different in the two jurisdictions. For both companies, only U.S. investors 
were able to obtain financial recoveries. The Sadia U.S. suit was settled for 
$27,000,000 and the Aracruz U.S. suit for $37,500,000. In contrast, Brazilian 
investors recovered nothing from those companies. This is because, as I discuss, 
there are no appropriate legal mechanisms in Brazil that enable direct investor 
indemnification by Sadia and Aracruz. Because of the lack of private class 
action avenues, investors had to rely on “derivative” suits, which provided 
only a small recovery to the company, rather than to its investors. Even if 
one considers that the recovery values obtained by U.S. ADR investors were 
relatively low, the Sadia and Aracruz cases provide concrete examples of the 
financial value distributions that characterize the current system of transnational 
Oct. 4, 2008, http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-acusa-aracruz-
e-sadia-de-especulacao-gananciosa,253360.
13 I conduct a comprehensive comparative case-study of the private and public 
enforcement actions and their factual backgrounds in the United States and in 
Brazil in a companion article. See Érica Gorga, Is the U.S. Law Enforcement 
Stronger Than That of a Developing Country? The Case of Securities Fraud 
by Brazilian Corporations and Lessons for the Private and Public Enforcement 
Debate (Oct. 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
14 The hearing of the Aracruz settlement took place on July 17, 2013. The Sadia 
case had already received the order authorizing distribution of the net settlement 
fund on February 26, 2013.
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securities litigation. They allow a broader assessment of the type of wealth 
transfers that affect the whole universe of cross border litigation and with 
implication to much larger and more frequent wealth transfers. 
This Article discusses the economic and legal problems in the global 
securities markets stemming from such potentially discrepant results. The fact 
that investors holding securities from the same companies suffered similar 
damages but were subject to such distinct legal remedies raises efficiency and 
fairness concerns for international securities markets. In fact, I show that the 
Brazilian investors bore most of the costs of the settlement payments to U.S. 
investors.15 Further, U.S. investors also indirectly benefited from the Brazilian 
derivative suit in one of the cases. In this way, the disparity between the 
U.S. and Brazilian legal rules and enforcement governing private securities 
litigation led to a transfer of financial value from the Brazilian companies 
exclusively to U.S. investors. 
This type of wealth transfer not only includes the typical “circularity 
problem” in securities litigation,16 which refers to the fact that innocent 
shareholders who did not contribute to the securities fraud bear the costs 
of compensation to the investors who lost value.17 The standard circularity 
problem supposes that those innocent shareholders who will compensate the 
class certified by the class action suit were not victims of the same fraud. The 
problem with the current regime of transnational securities litigation is more 
severe because, in addition to the classical circularity problem, it comprises an 
extra level of double taxation on foreign shareholders who already suffered 
from the same fraud, are not being compensated for their financial losses, 
15 In this Article, the expression “U.S. or American investors” refers to investors 
who acquired securities in the United States. Likewise, “Brazilian or foreign 
investors” are those who acquired securities in Brazil or elsewhere outside the 
United States. I adopt Morrison’s rationale of referring to the geographical 
location where the transaction occurred, instead of the purchaser’s or seller’s 
nationality. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). One 
has to concede that it is more often the case that the nationality of investors 
overlaps with the place in which they acquire securities, although this is not 
necessarily so. These were the cases of Sadia and Aracruz, in which the investors 
who acquired shares in the United States, lead plaintiffs of the class actions, 
were American pension funds and groups of investors.
16 The classic “circularity problem” in securities litigation was analyzed by John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: an Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 colum. l. Rev. 1534, 1538 (2006) (“[S]ecurities 
litigation imposes costs on investors because of harm done to investors — without 
recognizing that the victim is again bearing the costs of its own injury.”).
17 Id. at 1536 n.5.
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and still bear the pro rata burden of payment to U.S. investors. This scenario 
constitutes a “double circularity problem” for foreign shareholders who 
suffered equivalent damages to the U.S. class that is being compensated. 
This double circularity problem thus raises the question of whether foreign 
securities holders should bear twice the costs of failures of a company’s 
corporate governance practices. 
In addition to private enforcement variation, to be sure, public enforcement 
relative to the Sadia and Aracruz cases was also contrasting in the U.S. and 
the Brazilian markets. While the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) did not take action, administrative proceedings filed by Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários (CVM), the Brazilian securities regulator, resulted in 
fines and settlement payments by Brazilian board members and officers.18 
In this respect, one could argue that once public enforcement actions differ 
across jurisdictions, private enforcement actions should also be expected to 
vary.19 Notwithstanding, while differences in overall intensity of enforcement 
across countries have been acknowledged — and to some extent promoted20 
— by the literature, public enforcement actions are less likely to facilitate 
wealth transfers between jurisdictions than private actions are. As the Sadia 
and Aracruz cases show, the Brazilian public enforcement actions did not 
result in financial compensation to securities holders.21 Therefore, once this 
18 See Gorga, supra note 13 (discussing public enforcement actions in Brazil, and 
the lack of actions in the United States). One officer was forbidden to hold a 
managerial position for specific time.
19 I acknowledge that public and private enforcement are parts of a total system 
of investor protection offering compensation and deterrence, and that they can 
both substitute or complement one another. I thank Roberta Romano for raising 
this issue. Nonetheless, I focus on the analysis of private enforcement actions 
in this Article because their resulting distributional effects across countries 
are currently more significant. If public enforcement actions also result in 
distributional problems among securities holders of the same issuer, I believe that 
the same arguments advanced in this Article can largely apply. Current available 
evidence shows that some types of public enforcement actions may result in 
wealth transfers to U.S. investors. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation 
for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 stan. 
l. Rev. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400189. In 
this vein, public enforcement actions might also aggravate the wealth transfer 
effects in transnational securities markets, which this Article discusses, depending 
on who bears their costs — the company or individual managers. 
20 Defendants of the limits of extraterritoriality effects of the U.S. securities law 
regime have, in this sense, defended the ability of different jurisdictions to tackle 
securities fraud as they see fit. See infra notes 25-26.
21 See Gorga, supra note 13, Section V.
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Article analyzes the distributional effects in international markets generated 
by securities law enforcement,22 it primarily focuses on private actions, in 
which these issues seem to be more relevant at present.
The Sadia and Aracruz outcomes demonstrate the practical flaws of the 
existing transnational regime of private securities litigation. These flaws 
were later substantially exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,23 which excluded the cause of 
action previously available to f-cubed claims based on the U.S. antifraud 
securities regime.24 Morrison’s transactional test has echoed the location-
based rule proposed by several scholars.25 A substantial academic literature 
has been produced regarding the extraterritoriality of the U.S. securities law 
regime previously and especially in the wake of Morrison. In fact, a number 
of scholars have criticized the extraterritoriality of U.S. antifraud provisions 
due to increased costs and economic harm to foreign issuers and investors, 
as well as pernicious political impact on U.S. international relations.26
22 Distributive and allocative effects in the corporate control market have already 
attracted the attention of corporate law scholars discussing antitrust concerns. 
See generally Edward B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 
77 caliF. l. Rev. 1365, 1372 n.13 (1989) (discussing the relevant literature on 
distribution of wealth in antitrust analysis and fairness concerns embodied in 
antitrust laws).
23 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
24 Foreign cubed or simply f-cubed litigation refers to actions brought in the United 
States against foreign issuers of securities on behalf of foreign investors who 
acquired the securities on a foreign exchange. See infra Part II for a discussion 
of Morrison. 
25 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities 
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 colum. J. tRansnat’l l. 14, 15 
(2007-2008) (defending a “jurisdictional limit based on the location of investment 
transactions” for foreign-cubed claims); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, 
Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 
wis. l. Rev. 465, 596 (“Courts should presume jurisdiction over all investors 
trading in a foreign issuer’s securities within the United States, and presume no 
jurisdiction over 10b-5 suits for foreign investors trading in the securities of a 
foreign issuer outside the United States.”); Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as 
Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the Securities 
Laws, 43 u.c. davis l. Rev. 1071, 1072 (2010) (“[O]nly foreign investors who 
purchase or sell stock in the United States have standing to invoke the securities 
laws.”).
26 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of 
American Securities Law, 17 nw. J. int’l l. & bus. 207, 208 (1996-1997) 
(pointing out “conflicts between the United States and other nations.”); Stephen 
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Most of the literature, however, has focused on theoretical analysis to 
conclude that there are generic “costs” associated with the extraterritorial 
effects of the U.S. regulation and to propose policy reforms to reduce them. 
When featuring case studies on actual litigation results, the literature has 
been restricted exclusively to analysis of cases and outcomes in the United 
States.27 It has neglected the development and outcome of cases in the issuer’s 
foreign jurisdiction whose securities regime wrongdoers are also subject to. 
The literature therefore is bereft of qualitative case studies comparing the 
outcomes across jurisdictions achieved by private litigation based on the 
same type of alleged corporate wrongdoing.
The practical result of this surprising focus has heretofore been to prevent 
scholars and regulators from distinguishing which costs they are referring to. 
By generically labeling “costs,” scholars conflate costs to American markets, 
American investors, foreign issuers, and foreign investors, as if these costs 
were always the same or directly additive as opposed to canceling each other.28 
Furthermore, they have aggregated costs stemming from micro securities 
transactions and macro costs allegedly created by the externalities of these 
transactions to the entire system.29 These aggregated costs are then compounded 
in magnitude to warrant a policy prescription intended to diminish them — all 
without precisely specifying which costs that policy aims to mitigate, who 
bears those costs, and whose pockets will be spared. 
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 s. cal. l. Rev. 903, 914 (1998) (arguing 
that the extraterritorial effects of U.S. securities regulation would “multiply the 
costs to investors and issuers”); Jill E. Fish, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering 
U.S. Regulation on Foreign Tender Offers, 87 nw. u. l. Rev. 523, 523, 554 
(1993) (arguing that the U.S. expansive jurisdiction “has proven costly” and that 
courts must consider “the political impact of applying U.S. law on international 
relations, U.S. foreign policy, and the development of multinational business”); 
see also Reuveni, supra note 25, at 1077.
27 See Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital: 
Another Look at the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 
Geo. J. int’l. l. 411 (2013) (surveying seventy-five legal cases against foreign 
private issuers brought in the United States). 
28 See supra notes 25-27.
29 See, e.g., Fish, supra note 26, at 523-24 (adding up generic political costs of the 
U.S. policy with economic costs from uncertainty produced to foreign business 
transactions, the result of which “may ultimately hurt American investors”). 
Missing in this approach is a specification of who bears each cost and whether 
they would simply all add up to ultimately compound the effects on American 
investors.
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In this Article I call attention to this current methodological flaw and argue 
that the academic literature, as well as regulators,30 has neglected particular 
costs stemming from the economic distribution resulting from private litigation 
in multiple jurisdictions, as occurred in the Aracruz and Sadia cases.31 In this 
respect, I take a differentiated and specific methodological approach, focusing 
on the distributional costs and welfare effects produced by Morrison. Based 
on these case studies, I show that the current Morrison rationale of banning 
U.S. securities law protections to f-cubed claims, contrary to the common 
academic assessment,32 raises substantially the costs borne by foreign investors 
from cross-listing in the United States. In fact, these investors, who usually 
don’t enjoy the same antifraud protections overseas — due to the lack of 
appropriate law or enforcement mechanisms — are compelled to accept, to 
their detriment, wealth transfers from their investment to U.S. investors. In 
this fashion, Morrison leads to (i) non pro rata shareholder compensation, 
and (ii) wealth transfers from foreign to U.S. investors.
These specific costs borne by foreign investors must be added to the general 
welfare equation used to orient international policy prescriptions. They should 
be taken into account in the strategic decisions of securities holders and issuers 
as well as regulators. To cope with this problem, the Article turns to potential 
solutions to the current transnational securities litigation system. It reviews 
reform proposals to assess which could diminish wealth transfers or provide 
uniformity of legal results and remedies for shareholders who have suffered 
equivalent harms, thus minimizing distributional effects in international 
capital markets. These proposals would harmonize the impact of corporate 
governance failures among securities holders across different jurisdictions. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Sadia and Aracruz 
cases, discussing the factual background and contrasting the legal mechanisms 
and results of the private suits in the United States and in Brazil. Part II reviews 
the Morrison decision and the academic literature produced in its aftermath, 
presenting a critical analysis of the current debate and reform proposals. 
Part III uses the outcomes from the Sadia and Aracruz litigations to discuss 
problems with the current system of transnational securities litigation. I show 
30 See, e.g., u.s. sec. & exchanGe comm’n, study on the cRoss boRdeR scoPe oF 
the PRivate RiGht oF action undeR section 10(b) oF the secuRities exchanGe 
act oF 1934 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-
study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf. See infra Part II for further discussion 
about the regulatory and scholarly focus.
31 A number of other cases also corroborate my arguments. See, for example, the 
discussion of the German Telekom case infra notes 143-144 and accompanying 
text.
32 See sources cited supra note 26.
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that Morrison aggravates the wealth transfers brought to light by the Sadia 
and Aracruz cases and by other examples such as the German Telekom case. 
I further contend that the market solution does not convincingly tackle the 
problem. Part IV reviews reform proposals, inquiring as to whether they 
address these current failures. One possibility is a reform in the U.S. system 
of private litigation that would overrule Morrison. Another alternative is to 
rely on reforms in foreign jurisdictions that could provide private enforcement 
mechanisms to foreign investors, so as to minimize wealth transfers to U.S. 
investors. Because of the shortcomings associated with the implementation 
and results of these proposals, the Article then endorses a different set of 
private ordering reforms that would yield the same legal outcomes for both 
U.S. and foreign securities holders, thus achieving pro rata compensation to 
all damaged investors. The last Part concludes.
I. the Sadia and aracruz cases 
Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose S.A. were both major exporting companies, 
considered Brazilian industrial champions. Sadia operated in the food and 
beverages industry, selling its products throughout Latin America, the Middle 
East, Asia, and Europe.33 Aracruz was a major forest products manufacturer 
and the world’s biggest eucalyptus pulp producer.34 Both companies were listed 
on the Brazilian stock exchange BM&FBovespa, Level 1 listing segment.35 
Both companies had sponsored ADRs programs on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Sadia had listed Level II ADRs on the NYSE, as well 
as on the Spanish Market for Latin-American Stocks in Euros (LATIBEX).36 
Aracruz, in its turn, had listed on the NYSE Level III ADR program.
A. Factual Background
Because the two companies were exposed to exchange rate fluctuations due to 
their regular business operations, they usually engaged in hedging to protect 
33 See Kenneth Rapoza, CFO Who Laid Low Brazil’s Sadia: Blame It on Lehman, 
dow Jones newswiRes (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.advfn.com/nyse/StockNews.
asp?stocknews=PDU&article=37334277&headline=cfo-who-laid-low-brazils-
sadia-blame-it-on-lehman. 
34 See Carlos Caminada, Aracruz Slumps Most in 14 Years on Derivatives Loss 
(Update2), bloombeRG (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news
?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4pPZj1QIZhM. 
35 See supra note 6.
36 I was not able to find any private actions connected to the LATIBEX securities 
on the Spanish market. 
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their cash flows. Between 2004 and mid-2008 the Brazilian currency — the 
real — continuously appreciated against the U.S. dollar. Hoping that the 
trend would continue, many companies began speculating with derivative 
instruments offered by financial institutions — the so-called Sell Target 
Forward (STF) contracts.37
Both companies had affirmed in their disclosure materials in Brazil and in 
the United States that they relied on hedging instruments to protect against 
risk exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. They stated that their currency 
contracts did not represent substantial economic or financial risks to investors.38 
However, the global financial crisis resulted in the sudden appreciation of the 
dollar against the real, inflicting on Sadia and Aracruz — as well as many 
other companies39 — massive mark-to-market losses.40 Their share prices fell 
37 Carlos Caminada & Adriana Brasileiro, Aracruz Faces $2.13 Billion Deadline 
Over Derivatives, bloombeRG (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSwbsXO7zIRU&refer=news. Banks like 
Citigroup Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Barclays Plc, Banco UBS Pactual SA, 
Deutsche Bank AG, and others sold the derivatives. 
38 Consolidated Amended Complaint at 17-22, In re Sadia, S.A. Securities Litigation, 
643 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), No. 1:08-cv-09528 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2009); ECF No. 25. Amended Class Action Complaint at 20, City Pension 
Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Miami Beach v. Aracruz 
Celulose S.A., 1:08-cv-23317 (Oct. 5, 2009), ECF No. 30. See Gorga, supra 
note 13 Section III, for detailed factual description.
39 See, e.g., Braskem perde R$ 849 milhões [Braskem Loses R$ 849 Million], o 
estado de são Paulo [state oF são Paulo], Nov. 6, 2008, http://economia.
estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,braskem-perde-r-849-milhoes,273259; Mariana 
Barbosa, Vicunha negocia com bancos liquidação de derivativos [Vicunha 
Negotiates with Banks Derivatives Liquidation], o estado de são Paulo [state 
oF são Paulo], Nov. 3, 2008, at B12; Mariana Barbosa, Votorantim perde R$ 
2,2 bi com derivativos [Votorantim Loses R$ 2.2 Billion with Derivatives], o 
estado de são Paulo [state oF são Paulo], Oct. 11, 2008, at B14; Lilian Cunha, 
Ajinomoto tem perda de R$ 180 mi com câmbio [Ajinomoto Has Loss of R$ 
180 Million with Exchange Rates], valoR econômico [econ. value], Jan. 20, 
2009, at C1; David Friedlander & Marianna Aragão, Tok & Stok é vítima dos 
derivativos [Tok & Stok Is a Victim of Derivatives], o estado de são Paulo 
[state oF são Paulo], Jan. 25, 2009, at B10; Marli Olmos & Graziella Valenti, 
Embraer tem perda com o dólar mas espera reversão [Embraer Loses with the 
Dollar, But It Expects a Reversal], valoR econômico [econ. value], Nov. 5, 
2008, at D3.
40 Caminada & Brasileiro, supra note 37. The value of the dollar abruptly appreciated 
thirty-three percent against the real.
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sharply. As a result, the accumulated losses of Sadia and Aracruz reached 
around 1.1 and 2.13 billion dollars, respectively.41
B. U.S. Private Suits
Shortly after these great losses, federal securities class actions were filed 
in New York and Florida. On November 5, 2008 lead plaintiffs “the Sadia 
Investor Group” filed a complaint against Sadia S.A. and certain managers in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.42 On 
November 26, 2008, City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers 
in the City of Miami Beach (hereafter referred to as “Miami Beach”) filed a 
complaint against Aracruz Celulose S.A. and certain managers in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division.43
Both complaints asserted that the companies’ great losses could not be 
explained by pure hedging activity and that defendants misrepresented the 
nature and extent of their currency hedging strategies in their 6-K Forms. They 
alleged that the wild bets in the derivatives markets contradicted the companies’ 
policies, public statements, and disclosure materials. The companies and their 
executives were gambling away shareholder money in highly volatile currency 
investments; and senior executive officers and/or directors knew, or recklessly 
disregarded, that adverse facts were hidden from the investor public.44 As a 
41 Caminada & Brasileiro, supra note 37; Tatiana Freitas, Derivativo leva Sadia 
a prejuízo de R$ 2,5 bi [Derivative Causes Sadia a Loss of R$ 2.5 Billion], o 
estado de são Paulo [state oF são Paulo], Mar. 28, 2009, http://economia.
estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,derivativo-leva-sadia-a-prejuizo-de-r-2-5-bi,346128. 
R$2.5 billion is equivalent to $1,099,142,750, using the dollar exchange rate 
provided by Brazilian Central Bank on Mar. 28, 2009. 
42 Plaintiffs included Westchester Putnam Counties Heavy & Highway Laborers 
Local 60 Benefit Funds, Alan Hyman, Phil Carey, Steve Geist and Peter Stricker. 
Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at *41. 
Defendants included Luiz Fernando Furlan, Chairman; Gilberto Tomazoni, 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during the class period; Welson Teixeira, Jr., 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO); Adriano Lima Ferreira, CFO during the class 
period; Walter Fontana Filho, former company’s CEO and Chairman; Eduardo 
Fontana d’Avila, company’s Vice Chairman during the class period.
43 Amended Class Action Complaint, Aracruz, No. 1:08-cv-23317, at *49. Defendants 
included Carlos Alberto Vieira, former Chairman of Aracruz, Carlos August 
Lira Aguiar, CEO during the class period, and Isac Roffé Zagury, CFO during 
the class period.
44 Id. at *50; Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, 
at *37.
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consequence of the false disclosure, the prices of Sadia and Aracruz ADRs 
were inflated during the class period, causing financial injury to members of 
the class when the prices later dropped.45 Plaintiffs then alleged violations 
of section 10(b), including Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and section 
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.46
Plaintiffs and defendants agreed to settle the Sadia litigation for a cash value 
of $27,000,000.47 In a memorandum opinion and order issued on December 
28, 2011, the court approved the settlement as in the best interests of the class. 
The attorneys’ fees were established as thirty percent of the net settlement 
fund ($8,100,000), plus $723,228.36 in expenses and interest.48 The balance 
of the net settlement fund was $18,012,711.96 on January 31, 2013, to be 
distributed to U.S. class members.49
45 Amended Class Action Complaint, Aracruz, No. 1:08-cv-23317, at *42-43; 
Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at *5-7.
46 Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at *3, 22; 
Amended Class Action Complaint, Aracruz, No. 1:08-cv-23317, at *13, 24, 42. 
47 My focus in this Part is mainly on the final outcomes of the cases. See Gorga, 
supra note 13, Section IV (examining the suits’ details such as procedural 
developments, substantive arguments, and court decisions). For a detailed 
discussion of the settlement negotiations, see Joint Declaration of Joseph E. 
White III and Jennifer L. Enck in Support of Class Representatives’ Motion 
for Distribution of Net Settlement Fund, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at 
*16-17.
48 The judge reviewed and lowered attorney’s requested rates for support staff and 
eliminated fees for non-lawyer investigatory work, approving a $7,797,961.50 
lodestar fee corresponding to approximately 20,530 work hours. The expenses 
($723,228.36) total approximately three percent of the value of the settlement. 
The court also awarded an additional $14,177.50 to class representatives for 
their related costs and expenses. In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521.
49 Joint Declaration of Joseph E. White, III and Jennifer L. Enck in Support of Class 
Representatives’ Motion for Distribution of Net Settlement Fund, In re Sadia, 
643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at *3. During the specified class period, approximately 
14,900,000 Sadia ADRs were acquired and potentially damaged. The average 
recovery, according to the settlement agreement, amounted to $1.81 per allegedly 
damaged ADR, before deductions of court-approved costs and attorneys’ fees. 
The average cost per damaged ADR was estimated at $0.66 before the court 
approval of attorney fees. As the judge established a smaller fee percentage 
(thirty percent) than the one requested by the lawyers (33.33%, the final value 
should have decreased. See Exhibit 1, Exhibit A, Notice of Pendency of Class 
Action and Proposed Settlement, Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses and 
Settlement Fairness Hearing, In re Sadia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 521, at *1-2. One 
could then raise the point that significant wealth transfers were also made to the 
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After incurring such great financial losses, Sadia S.A. was forced to 
consolidate with Perdigão S.A., and both corporations were succeeded by 
BR Foods S.A.50 BR Foods later disclosed that the payment of the settlement 
was made with Sadia’s operating income.51
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Coffee, supra note 16 at 1538 (“[A] significant percentage 
of the transfer payment goes to lawyers and other agents.”).
50 Antonio Regalado & Lauren Etter, Perdigão Strikes Deal with Sadia, wall 
st. J., May 21, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124273713892234345 
(“The deal was forced by financial troubles. Both firms posted quarterly losses 
this year on a drop of exports, and Sadia has struggled after huge losses on 
currency bets last year left it burdened by debt.”). Perdigão S.A. has also been 
cross-listed on the NYSE since 2000. One could then argue that both Brazilian 
and American investors paid for the settlement amounts and thus the wealth 
transfer did not impose a burden solely on the Brazilian domestic market. 
While I acknowledge this point, two caveats are important. First, BR Foods 
Level III ADRs, which trade on the NYSE and now reference ordinary shares, 
represented approximately only thirteen percent of the company’s ordinary 
shares from 2012 and 2013 when the settlement payment was processed. See 
BR Foods S.A., Formulários de Referência [Reference Forms], cvm (Apr. 
18, 2013), https://www.rad.cvm.gov.br/enetconsulta/frmGerenciaPaginaFRE.
aspx?CodigoTipoInstituicao=1&NumeroSequencialDocumento=26193; BR 
Foods S.A., Formulários de Referência [Reference Forms], cvm (Apr. 16, 
2014), https://www.rad.cvm.gov.br/enetconsulta/frmGerenciaPaginaFRE.aspx?
CodigoTipoInstituicao=1&NumeroSequencialDocumento=36278. Second, and 
most importantly, as I further discuss in Part III below, the circularity problem 
in this case presents a multiplier component, as the costs also fall on Brazilian 
shareholders who suffered the underlying securities fraud. 
51 bRasil Foods s.a., demonstRações FinanceiRas [standaRd Financial statements] 
162 (2011), available at http://www.brasilfoods.com/ri/siteri/web/arquivos/
dfp2011_en.pdf:
The subsidiary Sadia and some of its current and former executives were 
named as defendants in five class actions suits arising from investors of 
American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) issued by Sadia and acquired 
in the period from April 30, 2008 to September 26, 2008 (Class Period). 
. . . During the second semester of 2011, the Company reached a final 
agreement with the plaintiffs homologated by the U.S. judicial authority 
and as a consequence settled the case with a payment of US$27,000. The 
Company’s [sic] previously recorded a provision superior to the amount 
of the settlement, therefore, a reversal in the amount of R$118,684 was 
recorded in the other operating income. 
 According to this statement, the company relied on Sadia’s operating income 
to pay the settlement, and not on the D&O insurer policy eventually in place at 
the time.
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Therefore, the Sadia lawsuit resulted in a wealth transfer from investors 
of the successor company to Sadia’s ADR investors in the United States as 
compensation for those investors’ damages. Furthermore, as I discuss below, 
the Brazilian shareholders who acquired preferred shares in the Brazilian 
market equivalent to the ones in custody with the U.S. ADR program sponsor 
ultimately received no compensation for the equivalent financial harm they 
suffered. 
The Aracruz suit led to similarly non pro rata distributions, despite some 
procedural differences in relation to the Sadia litigation.52 The parties reached 
a settlement agreement for a $37,500,000 cash payment compensating Aracruz 
ADRs investors. The court then approved the settlement and its allocation 
plan, as well as certifying the plaintiff class. It awarded the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
33.33% in attorneys’ fees, which corresponded to $12,500,000 of the settlement 
fund.53 It also allowed reimbursement of $839,703.18 in lawsuit expenses and 
a $40,000 award for reasonable costs and expenses incurred in representing 
the class.54
On December 31, 2009, Aracruz merged into Fibria Celulose S.A. (formerly 
Votorantim Celulose e Papel), with Fibria as the surviving entity.55 A report 
52 See Gorga, supra note 13, Section IV.2.
53 Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses and Incorporated Memorandum of Law 
in Support, Aracruz, No. 1:08-cv-23317, at *57. See supra text accompanying 
note 49, regarding wealth transfers to U.S. attorneys.
54 Id.; see Exhibit A, Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Settlement Fairness Hearing, 
Aracruz, No. 1:08-cv-23317, at *2. During the class period, 11,000,000 Aracruz 
ADRs were traded and the average recovery under the settlement amounted to 
$3.41 per allegedly damaged ADR, before deductions of court-approved costs 
and attorneys’ fees. The requested fees would amount to “an average of $1.13 
per allegedly damaged ADR.”
55 On August 27, 2009 a 6-K form filed with the SEC announced a shareholders’ 
meeting had approved the merger of Aracruz with Votorantim Celulose e Papel 
S.A. See Carlos Caminada, Aracruz, VCP to Merge, Form Top Eucalyptus-Pulp 
Maker (Update2), bloombeRG (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.0ZRPotKneA. Fibria is also cross-listed 
on the NYSE, negotiating Level III ADRs lastly issued in 2012. It negotiated 
approximately fifty-one percent and forty-six percent of its securities in the United 
States in 2012 and 2013, respectively. See Fibria Celulose S.A., Formulários 
de Referência [Reference Forms], cvm (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.rad.cvm.
gov.br/enetconsulta/frmGerenciaPaginaFRE.aspx?CodigoTipoInstituicao=1&
NumeroSequencialDocumento=25697; Fibria Celulose S.A., Formulários de 
Referência [Reference Forms], cvm (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.rad.cvm.
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from the administration commenting on the 2012 financial statements of 
Fibria stated that the costs of the U.S. Aracruz litigation were “significantly” 
supported by Fibria’s Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance policy.56
Because Fibria disclosed that its D&O insurance policy covered most of 
the lawsuit costs, one could then argue that Aracruz’s Brazilian investors did 
not support the costs of the Aracruz settlement to the same extent that Sadia’s 
Brazilian investors did. However, although scholars report that “[a]lmost all 
shareholder litigation settles within the limits of available D&O insurance,”57 
Brazilian investors still bore the costs of the D&O insurance coverage. These 
costs are driven by two variables: first, the value of deductibles for large 
companies is hardly negligible, reaching the millions;58 and second, deductibles 
may increase after a claim is submitted. 
Another observation concerns the impact of currency exchange on the costs 
of the U.S. litigations for Brazilian investors. Because the dollar is overvalued 
in relation to the Brazilian reals,59 any payment made in connection to a 
U.S. legal expense has to be multiplied by the actual currency rate in order 
to reflect the real value supported by Brazilian investors. For instance, as 
disclosed by Fibria, the $37,500,000 payment to ADR holders corresponded 
to R$76,600,000 after currency exchange conversion. This is to say that in 
gov.br/enetconsulta/frmGerenciaPaginaFRE.aspx?CodigoTipoInstituicao=1&
NumeroSequencialDocumento=35525. For a discussion regarding the burden 
of costs, see supra note 50.
56 FibRia celulose s.a., demonstRações FinanceiRas [consolidated Financial 
statements] 3, 50 (2012), avalaible at http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2012/fibria-
financial-statements-2012.pdf: 
In December, Fibria ratified an agreement in respect of class action suit 
brought against the Company in November of 2008 by potential ADR 
buyers from April 7 to October 2, 2008 . . . . Under the agreement, the 
Company and its co-defendants agreed to pay a total of US$37.5 million 
to all the ADR holders during the period mentioned above. Because Fibria 
has Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance with cover extending to the 
company that will reimburse a significant part of this expense, there will 
be no material effect on the company.
57 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: 
The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Issuer, 95 Geo. l.J. 1795, 1806 (2006-2007).
58 Id. at 1819, 1824 n.144 (reporting deductibles of $8,900,000 for large corporations 
in 2005).
59 See the historical evolution of the official U.S. dollar exchange rate to the Brazilian 
real at the bRazilian cent. banK sys., http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/port/
ptaxnpesq.asp?id=txcotacao (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). To illustrate, in 2008 
the value of one dollar in reais oscillated from a low of R$1.55 on August 1 to 
a high of R$2.49 on December 5, after the crisis hit.
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any case, it is more expensive for Brazilian investors to pay expenses in 
dollars than in Brazilian reals. Once their securities investment was made in 
reals, they also bore a disproportional exchange rate for the costs of all legal 
outcomes in the United States.
Finally, even if one accepts that D&O insurance has absorbed some of 
the costs of the U.S. Aracruz settlement imposed on Brazilian investors, 
American ADR holders were still unequally favored by the non pro rata 
indemnification they received in relation to Brazilian investors who suffered 
the same damages. This is because, as I now turn to, in both the Aracruz and 
Sadia cases, the legal actions available in Brazil did not allow for any direct 
financial recovery on behalf of Brazilian investors. Even if one argues that 
this legal flaw was previously known to the Sadia and Aracruz Brazilian 
investors, who allegedly discounted the securities price, the cross-listing 
decision itself could have been made after their original investment, and 
market inefficiencies may also have taken their toll on foreign investors, as 
discussed in Part III below. 
C. Brazilian Private Suits
The Sadia and Aracruz lawsuits filed in Brazil are functionally equivalent to 
U.S. derivative suits, not to class actions. But procedural aspects of Brazilian 
derivative suits differ from their U.S. counterparts. Delaware law, for example, 
requires that, prior to bringing the suit, the shareholder first make a demand 
on directors to have the corporation bring the suit itself,60 or plead that such 
a demand would be futile.61
In contrast, the Brazilian derivative suit must be approved by a resolution 
in a general meeting of shareholders. The shareholders decide whether the 
corporation will bring a civil liability action against an officer or director 
for losses caused to the corporation’s property.62 If the shareholders approve 
60 model bus. coRP. act ch. 7D (requiring prior written demand with notice upon 
the directors); DE Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 (requiring the plaintiff shareholder 
to first make a demand on the board to sue a director/officer. Directors have the 
opportunity to dismiss the suit as not in the best interests of the corporation. If 
the board refuses, the shareholder can bring a derivative suit). 
61 The shareholder has to demonstrate a reasonable doubt that the board would 
independently make a fair decision as to litigating against its directors or managers. 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810 (Del. 1984). Even if demand is shown to 
be futile, the board can constitute a special independent litigation committee 
that may still decide not to pursue charges. Robert B. Thomson & Randall S. 
Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Suits, 57 vand. l. Rev. 
1747, 1758-59 (2004).
62 Lei No. 6.404, de 15 dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. 1.12.1976, art. 159 § 1º (Braz.).
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the suit but the company fails to bring the action within three months, any 
shareholder may file the lawsuit herself on behalf of the company.63 If the 
shareholders do not approve the suit, a shareholder owning five percent of 
the total capital may still bring the action on behalf of the company.64 Any 
financial recovery resulting from the suit will belong to the corporation, and 
the company shall reimburse all the expenses incurred by the shareholder 
who eventually filed the action.65
Brazilian shareholders of Sadia and Aracruz approved in their general 
meetings liability suits solely against the former CFOs of their companies, 
seeking to hold them liable for the financial losses they caused to the companies. 
Plaintiff Sadia filed a lawsuit in São Paulo against former CFO Adriano 
Ferreira, while plaintiff Aracruz filed against CFO Isaac Zagury in Rio de 
Janeiro. These cities were the defendants’ respective domiciles.
Sadia claimed that defendant Ferreira had violated his duties of care and 
loyalty by engaging in derivative transactions that breached the company’s 
financial policies, including their contracting limits and risk exposure ceilings.66 
Sadia also alleged he withheld information on the transactions from the board 
of directors and its committees. It claimed causality between his actions and 
omissions and the company’s financial losses, and requested indemnification 
against all the losses suffered. Although the Aracruz lawsuit proceeded in 
secrecy of justice,67 it is very likely that its legal arguments were generally 
63 Id. § 3º.
64 Id. § 4º.
65 Id. § 5º. The rationale of the Brazilian derivative suit reflects the model of 
concentration of corporate ownership that prevails in most Brazilian corporations. 
See Gorga, supra note 8; Gorga, supra note 6. It places decision rights in the 
hands of the shareholders at their general meeting, which usually enjoys a 
high participation rate. Shareholders with large blocks of shares are properly 
incentivized to participate, and minority shareholders are protected by the ability 
to file suit even if a controlling shareholder opposes the filing decision in the 
general meeting.
66 Because corporate and securities laws are federal laws in Brazil, the arguments 
were considerably different than the ones advanced in the securities class actions 
in the United States. See Gorga, supra note 13, Section IV.2.
67 códiGo de PRocesso civil [C.P.C.] [Brazilian Civil Procedure Code] art. 155 I 
(Braz.) exceptionally allows lawsuits to be processed in a confidential manner 
whenever doing so serves the “public interest.” Judges have allowed an increasing 
number of lawsuits to proceed this way, generating asymmetries of information 
in corporate litigation. I further discuss and criticize this issue in Gorga, supra 
note 13, Section IV.3.1. 
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similar to the ones raised in the Sadia suit.68
The São Paulo Justice Court upheld a legal argument raised by defendant 
Ferreira’s motion to dismiss.69 Ferreira relied on the fact that a subsequent 
meeting of Sadia’s shareholders approved without reservations the financial 
statements revealing the company’s losses. This fact, according to defendant’s 
counsel, invoked the application of an exoneration provision available in 
article 134 § 3º of Brazilian Corporations Law.70 The São Paulo appeal court 
upheld this argument and extinguished the suit for lack of legal basis, without 
judging its merits.71 After several appeals, the Superior Tribunal of Justice, the 
highest Brazilian court for private law, affirmed.72 As a consequence, Sadia 
lost its case and received no indemnification. Further, because Brazil adopts 
the “loser pays” system, Sadia also had to bear the expenses related to the suit.
The Aracruz lawsuit yielded a different outcome. Because the approvals 
of Aracruz’s financial statements in Aracruz’s shareholder meetings were 
performed “with reservations,”73 defendant Zagury could not rely on the legal 
exonerating provision of article 134 § 3º. Instead, the lawsuit proceeded and 
both parties agreed to settle the case for a payment of R$1,500,000 to Aracruz 
by defendant Zagury.74 Therefore the company recovered a minimal amount 
of its losses, but Aracruz shareholders in Brazil were not entitled to any 
direct financial recovery. This is because the financial results of a Brazilian 
68 The costs of this suit were borne by all Sadia investors, including U.S. investors. 
However, it is important to note that if the suit resulted in any financial recovery, 
that recovery would belong to the company, and therefore to all Sadia’s securities 
holders, including Brazilian and U.S. ones. See the discussion regarding the 
Aracruz derivative suit outcome infra note 73-76 and accompanying text.
69 Gorga, supra note 13, Section IV.2 (conducting a detailed analysis of the suit).
70 Lei No. 6.404, de 15 dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. 1.12.1976, art. 134 § 3º (Braz.) 
(“The approval, without reservations, of the financial statements and accounts 
shall exempt the officers and members of the statutory audit committee from 
liability . . . .”).
71 T.J.S.P. Agravo de Instrumento No. 990.09.362587-3. Relator: Des. Enio Zulani, 
diáRio de Justiça [D.J.] 27.09.2010, 792 (Braz.).
72 S.T.J. ResP. No. 1.313.725 — SP (2011/0286947-4). Relator: Min. Ricardo 
Villas Bôas Cueva, diáRio de Justiça eletRônico [D.J.E.] 19.02.2013 (Braz.). 
73 Ata da Assembleia Geral Ordinária da Aracruz S.A. [Minutes of the Annual 
General Meeting of Aracruz S.A.], comissão de valoRes mobiliáRios [secuRities 
and exchanGe commission] (Apr. 30, 2009), http://siteempresas.bovespa.com.
br/consbov/ArquivoComCabecalho.asp?motivo=&protocolo=201106&funcao
=visualizar&Site=C.
74 The corresponding value was $710,193.60 on December 3, 2012 (the day the 
settlement was approved or “data de homologação da transação”), according 
to the Brazilian Central Bank conversion rate.
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derivative suit, similarly to its U.S. counterpart, belong to the company and 
not to its shareholders. 
One could argue that the Brazilian shareholders could then have indirectly 
benefited from the company’s derivative suit settlement if the value of their 
shares rose as a consequence of the company’s cash recovery.75 However, 
precisely because this financial gain belongs to company, all the company’s 
securities holders could potentially benefit from securities price appreciation. 
The company’s capital recovery in a derivative suit is ultimately property of 
all Aracruz investors, both Brazilian shareholders and U.S. ADR holders. 
Hence, the Brazilian private enforcement action does not raise the same 
wealth distribution concerns that the U.S. securities class actions do. On the 
contrary, the Brazilian response produces an additional wealth transfer from 
Brazilian shareholders who directly suffered the securities fraud to other 
securities holders.76 
D. Comparison Between the American and the Brazilian Private Suits
Having described the final outcomes of the private actions filed in connection 
with Sadia and Aracruz’s financial losses in the United States and Brazil, I 
will now discuss why they were so contrasting. Considering the same factual 
background and alleged wrongdoing described above, one important question 
is why the type of legal lawsuits differed in both jurisdictions. As I discussed, 
private litigation in both cases relied upon securities class actions in the United 
States and derivative actions in Brazil.
75 However, the available literature has not been able to document positive share 
value reactions in response to litigation outcomes. See Adam C. Pritchard & 
Stephen P. Ferris, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class Actions Under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Mich. Law & Econ., Research 
Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=288216 (finding 
a high negative price reaction to the revelation of potential fraud, and a smaller 
statistically significant negative reaction to the filing of a lawsuit. The authors 
however do not find significant price reaction to the outcome of litigation); see 
also Paul A. Griffin, Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Stock Price 
Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: An Analysis of Sequential 
and Conditional Information, 40 abacus 21 (2004).
76 On another level, one can argue the following distributional effect: wealth is 
transferred from Brazilian trading shareholders, who directly suffered capital 
losses due the acute drop of their share value in the secondary market as a 
reaction to the securities fraud revelation, to non-trading investors who may 
have suffered less of a direct impact on their investment value due to the fraud. 
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I start with the Brazilian lawsuits. Although Brazilian law provides for 
a general class action framework to remedy losses to securities holders 
associated with capital markets transactions since 1989,77 there are many 
drawbacks hindering their use in practice. The existing framework prohibits 
contingency fees agreements by which plaintiffs’ attorneys could fund the 
class action litigation with the expectation of receiving a percentage of the 
recovery eventually obtained through either settlement or judgment.78 Therefore, 
private parties lack the economic incentives to bring claims. Public prosecutors 
also lack incentives and the expertise to bring these actions.79 The Brazilian 
securities law does not have a well-developed doctrine or case law analogous 
to the United States’ “fraud on the market” theory, so as to allow recovery 
of damages in a private securities fraud action.80 Other problems include 
procedural rules that preclude settlement agreements binding absent members, 
and a lack of discovery provisions for fact investigation.81 The difficulty of 
77 The closer functional equivalent to the U.S. private class action is the Brazilian 
“public civil action,” enabled by a statute from 1985. See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 
de Julho de 1985, D.O.U. de 25.7.1985 (Braz.). This action is called “public” 
because it was primarily conceived to be filed by public prosecutors. See id. 
art. 5º, I. Only in 1989 a new statute enabled public civil action claims based 
on losses caused to securities holders. See Lei No. 7.913, de 7 de Dezembro de 
1989, D.O.U. de 11.12.1989, art. 1º (Braz.).
78 Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 am. J. comP. l. 487, 519 (1986) 
(“Fee arrangements totally contingent upon success on litigation are not used 
and would be regarded as a violation of the attorney’s ethical duty to charge a 
fair amount his services.”).
79 Associations are also granted standing to sue under certain conditions, but 
individual class members are not. See Lei No. 7.347/85 art. 5º, V. 
80 See generally Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317, 2014 
WL 2807181 (June 23, 2014); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) 
(articulating fraud-on-the-market theory); Merrit Fox, Securities Class Actions 
Against Foreign Issuers, 64 stan. l. Rev. 1173, 1189-90 (2012) (“The fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance, by making class actions possible, made 
practical for the first time the pursuit of the claims of ordinary portfolio investors 
who suffer losses from share transactions at prices unfavorably influenced by 
issuer misstatements.”). 
81 See Gorga, supra note 13, at 52-55; see also Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in 
Brazil — A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 am. J. comP. L. 311, 341-45 
(2003) (discussing the shortcomings of Brazilian class actions); Antonio Gidi, 
The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin 
America, 37 bRooK. J. int’l l. 893, 918-19 (2012) (focusing on the settlement legal 
problems) [hereinafter Gidi, Recognition]; Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, 
Litigation Discovery & Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About “The 
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class actions, combined with the strategy that controlling shareholders took 
to make CFOs scapegoats for the firms’ financial losses, explains the filing 
of derivative suits in Brazil.82
Turning to the U.S. private lawsuits, these could, in theory, have been 
formulated as class actions or as derivative suits. But derivative claims involve 
substantial procedural hurdles,83 and judicial decisions are difficult to enforce 
internationally against foreign directors and managers residing in Brazil with 
no assets in the United States. These drawbacks are circumvented in securities 
class actions in which the corporation itself is the defendant.84
Given the developed class action infrastructure in the United States and 
its severely flawed counterpart in Brazil, another relevant question is why 
Brazilian shareholders were not included as plaintiffs in the U.S. securities 
class actions against Sadia and Aracruz. The decision to sue and which 
individuals to include in a class action are made by U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers 
based on economic considerations. A plaintiff’s lawyer will only file and fund 
a class action if the expected gains from the suit outweigh the expected costs 
of litigation.85 In performing this calculus, lawyers consider the optimal size 
for the class: additional class members should be included if the marginal 
gain from doing so is greater than its marginal costs.86
The costs of including foreign citizens in a U.S. class action, even before 
Morrison, which will be discussed in Part II below, were not trivial. Costs 
included deposing class representatives, managing discovery when most 
of the evidence and parties were outside the United States, effecting notice 
Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63 emoRy l.J. 1383 (2014) (discussing 
the lack of discovery in civil law jurisdictions and its consequences for corporate 
litigation).
82 For a discussion of controlling shareholders’ interests and incentives, see Gorga, 
supra note 13, at 52.
83 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 vand. l. Rev. 387, 
400 (2008) (“Thus, over a period of less than ten years, the demand requirement 
was recast to pose a higher hurdle to derivative suits alleging directors’ breach 
of duty.”); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 61 at 1762 (“The relative 
popularity of class actions could stem from the fact that these plaintiffs avoid 
some of the difficulties arising from the demand requirements and other procedural 
provisions that apply to derivative suits.”); supra notes 60-61 and accompanying 
text.
84 Gorga, supra note 13, at 51-52.
85 Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational 
Class Actions, 97 coRnell l. Rev. 87, 96 (2011).
86 Id. at 101; see also David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out 
Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79 Geo. wash. l. Rev. 542, 554-68 (2011).
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for class members residing in foreign jurisdictions, and calculating and 
delivering remedies for foreign citizens. For a judgment or settlement to be 
fully enforceable in the jurisdiction of foreign class members, the order of the 
American court must be recognized in foreign courts.87 Because there was no 
precedent of a suit against a Brazilian corporation in a U.S. securities class 
action, doubts existed as to whether American courts would certify Brazilian 
shareholders. Scholars opine that Brazilian courts would not recognize an 
American decision in a class action, making it likely that Brazilian shareholders 
would be excluded from U.S. class actions.88 Above all, doubts may have 
existed regarding the legal basis under the pre-Morrison conduct test to assert 
claims on the foreign plaintiffs’ behalf.89 Therefore, for all the reasons given 
above, it is very likely that U.S. lawyers found it too risky to include the Sadia 
and Aracruz Brazilian shareholders in their class actions. Having discussed 
the rationale underlying the strategic decisions of plaintiffs in the U.S. and 
Brazilian lawsuits, I now turn to the effects of Morrison on the complaints 
of foreign shareholders in the United States.
87 See Gidi, Recognition, supra note 81, at 895 (2012) (“The question therefore 
remains whether the class action defendant will be able to assert res judicata 
against the foreign absent class members in a subsequent proceeding, or whether 
foreign absent class members will be able to bring their own individual or class 
action lawsuits abroad.”).
88 Id. at 955 (“[A] judgment or court-approved settlement in a U.S. class action for 
damages would not be recognized or enforced in Latin American countries.”). 
See Matthew H. Jasilli, Note, A Rat Res? Questioning the Value of Res Judicata 
in Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Inquiries for Foreign Cubed Class Action Securities 
Litigations, 48 colum. J. tRansnat’l l. 114, 121-31 (2009) (discussing standards 
adopted by U.S. Courts for assessing “lack of superiority” and denying class 
certification); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to Flame? International Securities 
Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test,” 
52 va. J. int’l l. 405, 415 (2012):
The more profound and significant the differences between the home 
jurisdiction and the United States, the more a foreign plaintiff might find it 
attractive to sue in the United States. These profound differences also reduce 
the deference that the U.S. decision or settlement might receive abroad, thus 
negatively affecting the likelihood of its enforcement and the scope of claim 
preclusion. This possibility, in turn, affects the “superiority” requirement 
of a class action that includes foreign plaintiffs, leading American judges 
to exclude foreign claimants from the class altogether.
89 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating 
that only acts taken within the United States could be used to sustain foreign 
purchase claims). I thank George T. Conway III for making this point.
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Having discussed the rationale underlying the strategic decisions of plaintiffs 
in the U.S. and Brazilian lawsuits, I now turn to the effects of Morrison on 
the complaints of foreign shareholders in the United States.
II. MorriSon and current ProPosals for fIxIng  
transnatIonal securItIes lItIgatIon
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically changed the rationale of 
securities litigation involving foreign issuers in the United States. Before 
Morrison, U.S. courts had jurisdiction over cases based on conduct taking 
place in the United States and whose effect was felt within the United States. 
These standards had been criticized due to their lack of predictability and 
uncertainty in defining the extraterritorial limits of securities litigation.90 In 
many cases, courts relying on these tests extended the extraterritorial reach of 
U.S. securities laws.91 Hence, foreign firms at least faced a significant litigation 
risk in the United States in connection with the trading of their securities in 
foreign markets in f-cubed claims.92
Morrison announced a new “transactional test” by which the courts 
will assess the geographic reach of U.S. securities fraud laws. In order to 
determine the applicability of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,93 
90 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 25, at 67; Choi & Silberman, supra note 25, at 
467 (“[M]uch uncertainty surrounds the consideration of extraterritorial issues 
within securities class action lawsuits. The individual doctrines applied within 
the courts — such as the conduct and effects tests — are often ambiguous and 
difficult to predict.”); Guseva, supra note 27, at 433 (reviewing seventy-five 
cases against foreign private issuers between 2001 and 2011 and concluding 
that there is “a significant variation in court reasoning, entailing uncertainty 
with respect to the final disposition of cases”).
91 See, e.g., Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 
411 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Buxbaum, supra note 25 (discussing the case-law); 
Guseva, supra note 27.
92 Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d 409; Buxbaum, supra note 25; Guseva, supra note 27. 
The risk was higher for firms of specific jurisdictions that would more likely 
recognize an U.S. judgment. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe”). See generally Reuveni, supra note 25, at 
1111-17 (analyzing the legislative purpose of the 1934 Act and concluding that 
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the transactional test asks “whether the purchase or sale [1] involves a security 
listed on a domestic exchange, or [2] is made in the United States.”94 The 
Supreme Court concluded that section 10(b) applies to fraud in connection 
with the “purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, 
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”95
Plaintiffs in Morrison included (a) foreign investors who purchased shares 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (“f-cubed plaintiffs”); and (b) Robert 
Morrison, who purchased ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange. Robert 
Morrison’s ADR claim was dismissed for failure to allege pecuniary damage,96 
thus precluding an analysis of whether the over-the-counter (OTC) ADRs in 
question would fall under U.S. jurisdiction under the court’s new transactional 
test.97 The court’s decision, then, was restricted to an analysis of the f-cubed 
claims. While Morrison was successful in creating a bright-line test aimed 
at enhancing consistency in the application of U.S. law,98 the decision left 
several questions unanswered.99 Chief among these was the question how 
unsponsored ADRs that trade in the OTC market should be treated by courts.100
“Congress was concerned with American investors and markets” and “intended 
for administrative agencies, rather than private litigants, to enforce securities 
laws” when foreign issuers harmed them).
94 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
95 Id. at 2888.
96 In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec., No. 03 Civ.6537BSJ, 2006 WL 3844465, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
97 Grant Swanson, Note, A Comparative Law Analysis of Private Securities Litigation 
in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 87 chi.-Kent l. Rev. 965, 
981 (2012) (“Had Morrison remained in the case, it is almost certain that Justices 
Stevens and Breyer, the concurring Justices, would have decided that he was 
entitled to bring his suit in the United States because he purchased his ADR on 
an American stock exchange.”). However, this lack of an affirmative position 
has generated discrepant opinions in certain courts. See infra note 129 (pointing 
out the Societé Générale decision).
98 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880-81.
99 Daniel Hemel, Comment, Issuer Choice After Morrison, 28 yale J. on ReG. 
471, 471-73 (2011) (noting that questions have arisen regarding what it means 
for a purchase or a sale to be “made in the United States,” and regarding the 
interpretation of Justice Scalia’s “use of the logical disjunctive ‘or’”).
100 Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 
53 haRv. int’l l.J. 502, 522 (2012); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign 
Investors under U.S. Federal Securities Law, 75 law & contemP. PRobs. 161, 
165 (2012) (referring to confusion in the treatment of ADRs).
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According to the prevailing view of the Morrison test, section 10(b) will 
not apply to foreign transactions even if they involve the underlying securities 
of a sponsored ADR listed on a U.S. domestic exchange.101 For this reason, the 
Morrison decision potentially undermines the supposedly legal “bonding” that 
foreign companies achieve by cross-listing their securities in the United States.
The bonding hypothesis holds that shares of cross-listed companies in the 
United States are of greater value than those of non-cross-listed companies.102 
Traditionally the literature has posited that the positive value of the bonding 
effect was not restricted to securities traded in the U.S. markets, but also 
extended to the securities of U.S. cross-listed firms traded on foreign exchanges. 
Evidence has indeed shown that listing in the United States boosted prices 
for a company’s securities in its home-country.103 This phenomenon made 
cross-listing an attractive option for foreign firms. By listing just a portion 
of its securities in the United States, a firm could realize benefits for all its 
securities, therefore achieving positive externalities and returns higher than 
the costs of the U.S. listing.
One factor driving the bonding premium was investor ability to “exercise 
effective and low-cost legal remedies, such as class actions . . . that are simply 
not available in the firm’s home jurisdiction.”104 Yet Morrison, by denying 
101 See, e.g., Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts 
and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 minn. J. int’l l. 1, 11 (2011):
Many companies have ADRs trading in the United States. It cannot be 
possibly the case that the Supreme Court intended Section 10(b) to apply 
not only to the ADR itself but also to a foreign purchase of the underlying 
stock on a foreign exchange simply because the underlying shares are 
registered in the United States to enable the company to issue the ADR.
 See also infra note 129.
102 Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms 
Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. Fin. econ. 205, 205 (2004) (“[F]oreign 
companies with shares cross-listed in the U.S. had Tobin’s q ratios that were 
16.5% higher than the q ratios of non-cross-listed firms from the same country.”); 
see also Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Has New York 
Become Less Competitive than London in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign 
Listing Choices Over Times, 91 J. Fin. econ. 253 (2009). 
103 Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence 
from Dual-Class Firms, 72 J. Fin. econ. 519, 521 (2004) (“[D]espite the fact 
that most dual-class firms cross-list only the low-voting share class in the U.S., 
both share classes benefit from the announcement of a U.S. listing.”). 
104 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and 
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 colum. 
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this ability to foreign investors who acquired securities in a foreign exchange, 
has undermined the legal basis of bonding and thus threatened the bonding 
premium.105
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, for example, 
has interpreted Morrison in this restrictive way, collapsing the two prongs of 
Morrison into one. The court has focused only on where the transaction occurs, 
holding that section 10(b) does not apply to any transactions in a foreign 
market. In this way it has neglected the inquiry as to whether the security 
at issue is listed on a U.S. exchange.106 To restore the bonding premium to 
at least some particular types of cross-listed firms, commentators such as 
Daniel Hemel have proposed that the court revise its stand in future decisions 
to take the position that section 10(b) does apply to foreign transactions 
involving shares of firms that cross-list their common stock for trading on a 
U.S. exchange. With such a holding, foreign firms would be able to engage 
in a credible bonding commitment by adhering to U.S. law by means of a de 
facto issuer choice regime.107
l. Rev. 1757, 1780 (2002); G. Andrew Karolyi, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Problems and International Cross-Listings: A Defense of the Bonding Hypothesis, 
13 emeRGinG mKt. Rev. 516, 524 (2012) (reviewing the extant literature on legal 
bonding, but concluding that “a proper verdict about the bonding hypothesis, 
especially of its purer ‘legal’ form, has not yet been fully rendered. I think a more 
complete understanding of the enforcement mechanisms around the world, their 
financial needs as inputs and the full scope of legal outcomes is still needed”). 
105 To be sure, the legal bonding hypothesis has been questioned as the rationale for 
cross-listing — even before Morrison. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing 
and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 chi. J. int’l l. 141 
(2003); Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC 
and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 yale l.J. 1638 (2010); 
Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. 
Securities Laws?, 75 J. Fin. econ. 319 (2005); see also infra note 124 (discussing 
available studies on the effects of Morrison). An alternative hypothesis is that 
bonding can result from reputational effects, as advanced by a related body of 
literature. See Gilberto Loureiro, The Reputation of Underwriters: A Test of 
the Bonding Hypothesis, 16 J. coRP. Fin. 516 (2010) (arguing that reputational 
bonding could also affect share prices apart from the legal bonding discussed 
above); see also Hemel, supra note 99, at 480 n.58; Karolyi, supra note 104, at 
523-25.
106 See Hemel, supra note 99, at 473-74 (reviewing the Court’s decisions).
107 Id. at 487-88.
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In the same vein, Vincent Chiappini has reviewed how courts have applied 
the Morrison test to ADR transactions.108 He also proposes a more expansive 
approach, arguing that an investor’s purchase of sponsored ADR programs 
(Level III, Level II, Level I, and Rule 144A109) should meet one of Morrison’s 
prongs and therefore be subject to lawsuits under section 10(b). In contrast, 
unsponsored ADR programs should not be subject to U.S. antifraud claims.110 
Therefore, under this approach sponsored ADR programs would allow legal 
bonding.
The implications of Morrison’s “transactional test” go beyond f-cubed 
claims. Some commentators have focused on how it has affected fraud suits 
against foreign issuers brought by American investors who purchased securities 
abroad (“f-squared complaints”), criticizing that Morrison also bars American 
investors from seeking remedies under U.S. securities laws.111 If true, in this 
view, such a bar would mean a “shocking loss” of investor legal protection.112 
U.S. courts have in fact adopted this interpretation, thus excluding American 
investors who acquired securities overseas from U.S. securities class actions.113 
108 Vincent M. Chiappini, Note, How American Are American Depositary Receipts? 
ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 52 b.c. l. 
Rev. 1795 (2011).
109 See generally u.s. sec. & exchanGe comm’n, investoR aleRts and bulletins: 
ameRican dePositaRy ReceiPts (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/
alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf (explaining the three levels of ADRs).
110 See Chiappini, supra note 108, at 1832.
111 E.g., Nidhi M. Geevarghese, Note, A Shocking Loss of Investor Protection: The 
Implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 6 bRooK. J. coRP. Fin. & 
com. l. 235 (2011). Supreme Court Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred in 
the judgment but disagreed with the Court’s reasoning. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring): 
Imagine . . . an American investor who buys shares in a company listed only 
on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American subsidiary 
with executives based in New York City; and it was in New York City that 
the executives masterminded and implemented a massive deception which 
artificially inflated the stock price — and which will, upon its disclosure, 
cause the price to plummet . . . . [The] investors would, under the Court’s 
new test, be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b).
 See also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (showing how in this particular case the 
“American investor” is defined by her nationality, and not by the location where 
she acquired securities).
112 Geevarghese, supra note 111.
113 See, e.g., In re UBS Sec. Litig., No. 07-11225, 2011 WL 4059356, at *5-8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 
765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. 
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Commentators such as Nidhi Geevarghese have since proposed that Congress 
pass legislation to tackle these judicial holdings, and restore the protective 
rights of American investors for reasons of international comity and fairness.114 
Dona Muir, Junhai Liu and Haiyan Xu provide support for this proposal 
with their analysis of class action procedures in China, concluding that legal 
protections against securities fraud for investors who acquired shares from 
Chinese issuers are insufficient.115
Others support a return to pre-Morrison standards, albeit with a more 
focused approach. Marco Ventoruzzo has proposed a “new effects test” that 
aims to protect American investors and resolve the ambiguities created by 
Morrison and the pre-Morrison conduct-effects tests. Under Ventoruzzo’s 
proposal, U.S. court jurisdiction is limited to those cases in which the United 
States has a substantial interest because of effects produced in its domestic 
markets.116 In another proposal, Joshua Boehm recommends that Congress 
reinstate the conducts-effect test while imposing a reliance requirement on 
foreign transactions.117
Linda Simard and Jay Tidmarsh have argued that courts should not exclude 
foreign citizens from class membership solely because their country does 
not recognize an American class judgment or settlement. Instead, they have 
proposed that courts include the claims of individual foreign citizens if those 
claims are not worth pursuing individually, while excluding those that are. 
According to the authors, this proposal mitigates the risk that class members 
will re-litigate in foreign forums, and in this way provides a more thorough 
Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17514 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011) (dismissing 
the fraud claims by U.S. purchasers of Vivendi shares on foreign exchanges); 
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 
2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
114 Geevarghese, supra note 111, at 260 (“Such an approach will return robust 
investor protection measures to Americans investing in securities abroad, balance 
issues of international comity and fairness, and hopefully spur the development 
of stronger investor protections and complementary group litigation procedures 
overseas.”).
115 Dona M. Muir, Junhai Liu & Haiyan Xu, The Future of Securities Class Actions 
Against Foreign Companies: China and Comity Concerns, 46 u. mich. J.l. 
ReFoRm 1315 (2013).
116 Ventoruzzo, supra note 88, at 408-09.
117 Boehm, supra note 100, at 542.
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decision rationale than the standard misplaced consensus that foreign class 
members will inevitably sue in their home country.118
All this academic debate surveyed so far has largely neglected one key 
issue which this Article seeks to explore: the transfer of wealth from foreign 
to U.S. investors, and reform proposals addressing it. The policy-making 
arena has also sidestepped this distributional problem, even if regulators have 
not fully supported the Morrison decision and its policy ramifications for the 
U.S. markets. The controversy has brought about contrasting developments 
by the legislative branch. 
Congress immediately responded to the Supreme Court’s decision by 
affording extraterritorial jurisdiction to district courts in actions involving 
violations of antifraud provisions brought by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice.119 Many commentators, 
however, have noted that such a reform will not make any practical difference 
because, as Justice Scalia argued in Morrison, a statute must make “a clear 
statement of extraterritorial effect” in order to produce extraterritorial effects;120 
and the Dodd-Frank reform has failed to do so as it merely references jurisdiction, 
but not the power of courts to apply the law to particular facts.121
With respect to private actions under section 10(b), section 929Y of the 
Dodd-Frank Act required that the SEC conduct a study to determine the 
desirability of extending extraterritorial private rights of actions under the 
antifraud provisions. This study has now been released by the SEC.122 In 
its analysis of “the economic consequences of a cross-border extension of 
a section 10(b) private right of action in transnational securities,” the SEC 
118 Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 85, at 89-90.
119 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub, L. 
No.111-203, § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1864 (2010). This authority is granted if 
the fraud involves conduct within the United States, that is “a significant step in 
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the 
United States and involves only foreign investors,” or has a substantial effect 
within the United States. Id.
120 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
121 See generally Painter, Dunham & Quackenbos, supra note 101, at 4, 25 (arguing 
that Congress should “enact a legislative fix before the government and private 
parties are burdened by litigation”); see also Meny Elgadeh, Note, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank: Life After Dodd-Frank, 16 FoRdham J. coRP. & Fin. 
l. 573, 593-97 (2011) (articulating this argument in detail).
122 See u.s. sec. & exchanGe comm’n, supra note 30 (reporting excerpts of numerous 
public comments delivered by private and public parties, including regulators, 
which did not seem to have raised any consideration on distributional issues 
per se).
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opined that “[c]onsidering both the existing economic research and the results 
of our analysis, we are unable to document evidence of either economic costs 
or economic benefits that could be clearly and directly linked to extending a 
private right of action.”123 The SEC cited mixed economic empirical evidence 
that is largely inconclusive.124
One of the SEC’s proposals includes granting a section 10(b) right of 
private action for the purchase or sale of any security of the same class of 
securities registered in the United States, irrespective of the actual location 
of the transaction.125 Although the SEC’s analysis did not refer to the issue 
of cross-border wealth transfers between groups of investors, which is the 
focus of this Article, this proposal would certainly minimize Morrison’s 
distributional effects — discussed further in the next Part.
III. the Sadia and aracruz outcomes:  
the “double cIrcularIty” Problem In transnatIonal 
securItIes lItIgatIon
The Sadia and Aracruz cases did not involve any explicit discussion of U.S. 
extraterritorial jurisdiction discussed under Morrison for two basic reasons.126 
First, both litigations began before the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Morrison.127 
123 Id. app. B, at B1.
124 Id. app. B, at B8. One study by Licht and others finds evidence that Morrison 
has positively affected the stock prices of foreign firms, which would cut against 
a cross-border extension of the right of private action for foreign investors. 
Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siegel & Xi Li, What Makes 
the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the Supreme Court and 
Cross-Listed Firms (Harv. Bus. Sch. Strategy Unit, Working Paper No. 11-072, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744905. But see Louis Gagnon 
& G. Andrew Karolyi, Economic Consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Decision for Foreign Stocks Cross-Listed in 
U.S. Markets (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series No. 50-2011, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961178 (finding a thirty-seven basis point increase 
in the price deviation between cross-listed shares trading in the United States 
and the underlying home market shares at the time that Morrison was decided, 
which provides evidence that the market values positively the U.S. liability 
cause of action, data which supports a cross-border extension). 
125 u.s. sec. & exchanGe comm’n, supra note 30, at 64.
126 None of the documents available in the Sadia and Aracruz case dockets in 
Bloomberg Law filed by the parties or judicial orders contain any mention of 
Morrison. 
127 The Sadia and Aracruz litigations started respectively on November 5, 2008 
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Second, the Morrison holding would not impact the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action in either case, as the U.S. plaintiffs in both the Sadia and the Aracruz 
complaints were covered under the Morrison transactional test. Sadia and 
Aracruz listed their ADRs for trading on a U.S. exchange. Plaintiffs purchased 
these companies’ ADRs on a U.S. exchange — the NYSE.128 And indeed, even 
if the Supreme Court has sidestepped the ADR issue, most Court decisions 
interpret jurisdiction under Morrison to include acquirers of ADRs or American 
Depositary Shares (ADSs) in litigating securities fraud claims against foreign 
firms.129
A problem would arise only if Brazilian investors were potentially included 
as plaintiffs in the Sadia and Aracruz class action suits. Sadia and Aracruz did 
not list their underlying common or preferred shares on a U.S. exchange. These 
shares were listed and traded in the Brazilian São Paulo Stock Exchange — 
BM&FBovespa. The relevant question, then, is whether Brazilian securities 
holders of Sadia and Aracruz pass the Morrison “transactional test” and can 
participate as plaintiffs under the umbrella of U.S. jurisdiction. The answer 
is negative.
and on November 25, 2008. The judicial orders preliminarily approving their 
settlements were issued on September 22, 2011 and March 14, 2013. The 
Morrison litigation began in 2001, but the Supreme Court decision was issued 
on June 24, 2010. Even if Morrison was decided during the process of the 
Sadia and Aracruz litigations, its impact in their settlements is unclear as it did 
not impact plaintiffs’ claims in either of the cases. See infra notes 128-129 and 
accompanying text. 
128 See Chiappini, supra note 108, at 1825 (“Level II and Level III ADR programs 
fulfill Morrison’s listing prong because they are listed and traded on a U.S. 
exchange.”).
129 See, e.g., Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-CV-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, 
at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 
No. 02 Civ. 05571, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17514, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 
2011) (“The parties agree that Morrison has no impact on the claims of ADR 
purchasers since Vivendi’s ADRs were listed and traded on the NYSE.”); In re 
Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-Civ.-8761, 2011 WL 1442328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 18, 2011). But see In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (discussing 
the purchase of over-the-counter ADRs and concluding that “because [t]rade 
in ADRs is considered to be a ‘predominantly foreign securities transaction,’ 
Section 10(b) is inapplicable’” (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 
506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); Swanson, supra note 97, at 982 (arguing that the court 
applied a substantial effect rationale rejected by Morrison considering that the 
company had only a small percentage of its total equity in ADRs). 
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Morrison expressly says that the reach of the section 10(b) antifraud regime 
does not extend to purchases of the issuer’s underlying common stock in foreign 
markets.130 Therefore, under the current interpretation of Morrison, Sadia’s 
and Aracruz’s Brazilian investors — that is, investors who acquired Sadia’s 
and Aracruz’s preferred (or common) shares in Brazil — are not entitled to 
participate as plaintiffs in U.S. suits.131 Under this current interpretation, only 
foreign investors who purchase securities either through a U.S. exchange or 
otherwise in the United States would pass Morrison’s transactional test and 
thus reap the benefits of U.S. securities laws.132
A simple cost-benefit analysis of the private enforcement actions in the 
United States and in Brazil makes evident the distributional problems posed 
by the current transnational litigation regime. On the one hand, while the 
costs of the U.S. class actions suits are borne by both foreign investors and 
U.S. investors, the cash recoveries produced by these suits are directly and 
exclusively distributed to U.S. investors who constitute the class that suffered 
from the securities fraud. On the other hand, the costs of the Brazilian derivative 
130 The case of Brazilian investors who acquired shares of Sadia and Aracruz in 
Brazil would be analogous to the Australian investors who acquired common 
shares of National Australia Bank in the Australian Stock Exchange. The only 
caveat here is that in the Sadia and Aracruz cases, the ADRs were referenced 
on preferred (nonvoting) shares and not on common shares, as was the case in 
Morrison. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010).
131 See Irwin H. Warren & Margarita Platkov, Further Look at Morrison: A Plain 
Meaning Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202474256238/Further-Look-at-Morrison-A-Plain-Meaning-Analysis?slret
urn=20140809103539 (arguing, as counsel for the defense in two cases in which 
the common shares were U.S.-exchange-listed to enable an ADR listing, but 
not listed for trading, that “listed” and “listed for trading” are different and that 
Justice Scalia purposefully used “listed” to mean “listed for trading”); see also 
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-1 (2011) (“The term listed means admitted to full trading 
privileges . . . .”).
132 See In re Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at 
*l-3 (CD. Cal. July 16, 2010); Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 
765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 
F. Supp. 2d 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. 
Supp. 2d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension 
Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177-78. (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The idea that a foreign company is subject to U.S. securities 
laws everywhere it conducts foreign transactions merely because it has ‘listed’ 
some securities in the United States is simply contrary to the spirit of Morrison.”); 
u.s. sec. & exchanGe comm’n, supra note 30, at 28.
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suits are supported by Brazilian and U.S. securities holders, but their financial 
gain indirectly benefits both Brazilian and U.S. investors.
In this vein, there are two major problems stemming from Morrison’s 
geographic transactional test for global securities litigation. The first concerns 
the different financial recoveries obtained by shareholders who hold similar 
securities and equivalent economic claims against the same company. As both 
Sadia and Aracruz demonstrated, U.S. ADR holders received cash compensation 
that was not paid pro rata to Brazilian shareholders. As Brazilian shareholders 
suffered the same harms as U.S. ADR holders, this result raises acute fairness 
considerations in the world of transnational securities transactions.
As discussed above, the Brazilian shareholders could have theoretically had 
a cause of action in the United States against both companies at the time the 
Sadia and Aracruz suits were filed. The failure of U.S. class action plaintiff 
lawyers to file that claim on behalf of Brazilian shareholders is probably 
explained by a cost-benefit decision.133 Morrison has aggravated this incentives 
problem for all claims by foreign investors by denying altogether a cause of 
action for shareholders who acquired securities outside the United States. 
Apart from the non pro rata compensation issue, but still related to it, is a 
second problem. This concerns the question of who bears the cost of the capital 
transferred from current shareholders of the defendant corporation to a subset 
of equity holders who transacted in the United States or acquired securities 
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. The costs of compensation also fell on Aracruz’s 
and Sadia’s general foreign investors, including simultaneously harmed 
foreign investors, while exclusively benefiting their American counterparts. 
This burden raises distributive and allocative considerations related to the 
efficiency of the current system of transnational securities litigation.
As Merrit Fox explains:
Extending the U.S. cause of action to U.S.-resident purchasers of the 
issuer’s shares but not to foreign purchasers results in a non-pro rata 
dividend to the U.S. investors, paid for, typically, in large part by 
investors who are residents of the rest of the world. Unlike a traditional 
fraud action, any given U.S. investor is as likely to be a seller and the 
beneficiary of the conduct as she is to be a buyer and suffer a deprivation. 
If the U.S. buyers get compensation for their deprivations and foreign 
buyers do not, while sellers from everywhere keep their gains, there is 
an arbitrary transfer of wealth from foreign investors to U.S. investors.134
133 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
134 Fox, supra note 80, at 1237.
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When the company or its successor bears the expenses of a U.S. lawsuit, it 
uses corporate resources — which are supposed to belong to all equity holders 
— to pay a particular subset of U.S. equity holders. But what makes this 
particularly egregious is that, under Morrison, foreign shareholders who bear 
these expenses may have suffered the same damages as U.S. securities holders. 
This happens if they decided to keep their shareholding ownership instead of 
selling their stakes in the secondary markets.135 In this case, shareholders are 
supporting the costs of the company’s fraudulent representation twice: first, 
when their shares lose value due to the wrongdoing per se; second when they 
bear the costs of indemnification paid exclusively to U.S. securities holders. 
Therefore, Morrison results in U.S. class action compensations based on a 
cross-border value distribution to U.S. investors to the detriment of foreign 
investors. The problem with these distributions of wealth is that they are 
hardly justified either on Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks grounds.136
In this sense, foreign shareholders face an aggravated circularity problem.137 
The standard circularity problem applies to all securities holders who did not 
cause the fraud but did not suffer its direct losses either. These are securities 
holders who typically did not qualify to the class directly damaged by the fraud, 
since they acquired securities other than the ones that were overvalued on the 
stock market due to the material misrepresentations made by the company.138 
The basic circularity problem thus is clearly present in transnational securities 
litigation to the extent that all the unharmed investors of a company bear 
the costs of the compensation paid to harmed U.S. investors. Yet foreign 
shareholders who were damaged by the same securities misrepresentations, 
and thus suffered equivalent financial losses, may still bear compensation 
costs generated by the recovery of U.S. ADR holders in addition to not 
135 This strategy is likely to be undertaken by investors who do not want to fully 
consummate their losses, because they may expect the share price to appreciate 
in the future.
136 A Pareto improvement occurs when a change to a different economic allocation 
makes at least one individual better off without making any individual worse 
off. A new economic allocation is efficient under Kaldor-Hicks if the gains 
to individuals made better off exceed the losses of those whose position was 
worsened. Because Morrison makes foreign investors worse off, all transaction 
costs considered, it is hard to envision how the gains of American investors 
could be larger than foreign investors’ losses, especially if one considers the 
multiplier effect of these losses due to the double circularity problem.
137 See Coffee, supra note 16, at 1536 n.5 (arguing that innocent shareholders 
support the costs of securities fraud recoveries).
138 This is the Basic presumption of “class wide reliance derived from the fraud on 
the market theory.” See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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being indemnified for their own first-order financial losses. For this reason, 
transnational securities litigation presents a differentiated “double circularity 
problem” for foreign investors who bought overvalued securities but could 
not constitute a class for the sake of recovery as a consequence of the lack 
of class action litigation infrastructure in their home countries. In a nutshell, 
their burden presents a multiplier component vis-à-vis the typical shareholder 
not directly affected by the fraud. 
Notwithstanding, the literature has shown a bias toward the inapplicability 
of U.S. securities regulation to foreign issuers, alleging that such exemption 
would lower issuer costs for a U.S. cross-listing, therefore attracting foreign 
issuers with benefits of the U.S. markets.139 The literature has pointed out generic 
political and economic costs stemming from the extraterritorial effects of the 
U.S. securities regime that would damage U.S. foreign policy, multinational 
businesses, and ultimately American investors.140 However, considering the 
global allocation of costs and benefits untangled above, it is surprising that 
the literature has failed to distinguish the set of specific direct costs that the 
geographical rationale imposes on foreign securities holders. The case studies 
of the Brazilian corporations discussed in this Article thus shed light on the 
subsidization costs that foreign investors of foreign issuers bear as an intrinsic 
component of U.S. cross-listing under Morrison. Furthermore, these foreign-
bearer costs are likely to be generalized to foreign investors from all other 
jurisdictions that do not employ sophisticated systems of aggregate litigation 
that can provide direct recovery to shareholders through private enforcement.141
Although European countries have increasingly implemented new reforms 
to develop forms of aggregate litigation, there remain serious doubts whether 
these reforms will provide an effective institutional framework that fully 
supports collective litigation and financial recovery for collective redress.142 
139 See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg & Max Gulker, Cross-Border Shareholder Class 
Actions Before and After Morrison (NERA Econ. Consulting, Working Paper, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973770 (arguing that Morrison 
diminishes litigation costs and therefore should make it easier for foreign issuers 
to list in the U.S.).
140 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
141 If a foreign jurisdiction does not provide a class action system able to produce 
financial indemnification of its damaged shareholders, then its shareholders will 
generally support the costs of a financial recovery paid to American securities 
holders under Morrison without being compensated for their direct financial 
losses.
142 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic 
and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 vand. l. Rev. 1, 6 (2009) 
(providing a comparative overview of recent developments in Europe regarding 
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:08 PM
2015] The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms 169
For example, the trial of alleged securities misstatements involving Deutsche 
Telekom was the first test of the German reform that introduced aggregate 
litigation in 2005. A number of procedural problems, especially the lack of 
effective tools for discovery in Germany, have resulted in a ruling in favor 
of defendants; meanwhile an equivalent parallel litigation brought by U.S. 
Deutsche Telekom ADS holders in New York was settled for $120,000,000 
on their behalf.143 German commentators have described the law as “a flop.”144 
This German case also presents the type of double circularity problem discussed 
above.
In Italy, class actions were introduced in 2007, but also face a number 
of technical problems that include a lack of lawyers’ fees and access to 
information, prompting commentators to conclude that “the civil procedure 
system must be radically reviewed in order to generate a true, effective level 
of private enforcement in Italy.”145 In this regard, it is fair to say that virtually 
all foreign jurisdictions have either no mechanisms of aggregate litigation or 
newly-implemented and deficient mechanisms.146
aggregate litigation, but noting that “European receptiveness to new procedures for 
aggregate litigation, in one form or another, stops markedly short of full-fledged 
embrace for U.S.-style class actions, much less related features of litigation 
finance”); id. at 19-37; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will 
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 Vand. l. Rev. 179, 191-208, 209 
(2009) (discussing European problems with organizational standing, litigation 
funding and opt-in systems, and pointing out that “[f]rom the American vantage 
point, we look at the European experiments with a concern that law without the 
institutional framework for its enforcement is necessarily lacking”).
143 See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 11, In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. 
Litig., 229 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 00-CV-9475 (SHS)), available 
at http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1016/USD00/2005128_
r04s_00CV9475.pdf; Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 81, at 1488-91 (discussing 
the Deutsche Telekom case).
144 Id. at 1491 n.574.
145 Paolo Giudici, Representative Litigation in Italian Capital Markets: Italian 
Derivative Suits and (if Ever) Securities Class Actions, 6 euR. comPany & Fin. 
l. Rev. 246, 263-64 (2009).
146 See Mariana França Gouveia & Nuno Garoupa, Class Actions in Portugal, in 
the law and economics oF class actions in euRoPe 349 (Jürgen G. Bakhaus, 
Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2012) (“The effectiveness of 
class action litigation in Portugal is dubious to say at least.”); Deborah R. 
Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party 
Litigation Funding, 79 Geo. wash. l. Rev. 306, 309 (2010-2011) (“In most 
other countries with new class action regimes, there has been relatively little 
use of the procedure to date . . . . In these jurisdictions, there is a class action 
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Another aspect of the problem is that Morrison’s ban on foreign investor 
participation in U.S. class actions may also chill class actions in other 
jurisdictions. For example, some pre-Morrison U.S. class action counsels 
made use of provisions of the Dutch Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act 
(WCAM) statute that permitted the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to approve 
out-of-court settlements that parties have voluntarily negotiated, to settle non-
U.S. investors’ claims as happened in the Shell Petroleum case.147 However, 
post-Morrison, because non-U.S. investors lack class action remedies in the 
United States, companies may not have incentives to pursue those settlements 
with non-U.S. investors overseas.148 In this way, Morrison also precludes the 
procedure ‘on the books,’ but so far little appetite for using it.”); Muir, Liu & 
Xu, supra note 115 (discussing the failures of the Chinese system); Véronique 
Magnier, The French Civil Litigation System, the Increasing Role of Judges, 
and Influences from Europe, 622 annals am. acad. Pol. & soc. sci. 114, 
120 (2009) (identifying issues that would impair class actions in France); 
Rachel Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member 
States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 colum. J. euR. l. 409 (2008-2009) 
(discussing the shortcomings of the English system); Manning Gilbert Warren 
III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Actions: An Unlikely Export to the European 
Union, 37 bRooK. J. int’l l. 1075, 1100-10 (2012) (surveying recent European 
developments, including the “Rapporteur on Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress” and pointing out their problems); Mikko 
Välomäki, Introducing Class Actions in Finland: An Example of Law-Making 
Without Economic Analysis, in the law and economics oF class actions in 
euRoPe, supra, at 338 (“The Finnish implementation [of class actions] is one 
example of a failed process.”); see also S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in 
the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 
notRe dame l. Rev. 899, 969 (2012) (“European authorities need to proceed 
carefully, since there are signs that several of the procedures that are currently 
being proposed may unintentionally diminish the regulatory effectiveness of 
the collective redress mechanisms that are to be adopted.”).
147 Warren, supra note 146, at 1093-95. It is worth noting that even the most frequently 
lauded system of the WCAM restricts itself to securing court approval of out-
of-court settlements and does not provide tools for class recovery of monetary 
damages. Id. at 1110; see also Hensler, supra note 146, at 318 (“WCAM is a 
settlement vehicle.”).
148 Warren, supra note 146, at 1097:
It is reasonable to doubt whether Shell or Converium would have vigorously 
pursued settlements with non-U.S. investors if those investors had no class 
action remedies in the United States and had to deal with daunting legal 
obstacles in the EU member states in filing individual or collective claims. 
Post-Morrison, it appears unlikely that companies accused of securities 
fraud will be inclined to reach massive settlements with U.S. class action 
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development of class action remedies in foreign jurisdictions, exacerbating 
the problem of wealth transfers from foreign to U.S. investors. 
Still, one could raise exactly the opposite argument — that because Morrison 
signals that foreign investors can no longer rely on the protection of American 
law, foreign countries are incentivized to enact laws that protect their own 
investors. Accordingly, a possible solution for the double circularity problem 
relies not on reforming U.S. law, but on the development of foreign laws, 
an issue I further discuss in the next Part along with other reform proposals. 
Before moving to reform considerations, final remarks are necessary to 
address possible critiques that object to this Article’s thesis by relying on 
market solutions incorporating price-adjusting mechanisms. 
Scholars may argue that holding an ADR is not identical to holding the 
underlying share traded in the company’s home country. Investors hold 
different types of securities, negotiated under different securities regulatory 
regimes, and they should be familiar with the legal differences and legal risks 
that exist in each jurisdiction. Under this rationale, if investors are aware that 
they cannot rely on legal protection against securities fraud, they will discount 
securities prices so as to protect themselves ex ante against potential future 
losses. In this view, the Brazilian shareholders in the cases discussed were 
aware of the shortcomings in Brazilian securities litigation and accordingly 
adjusted the prices they paid for the companies’ shares. Moreover, they also 
assumed the legal risk of investing in cross-listed companies, knowing that 
those companies could be sued according to U.S. laws and end up paying 
large settlements. In this sense, they voluntarily subjected themselves to the 
risk of the wealth transfers discussed earlier. The prices of securities trading 
on international markets will anticipate the costs associated with potential 
wealth transfers to U.S. securities holders and adjust accordingly. Following 
this rationale — based heavily on efficient market theory — foreign investors 
will be protected against wealth transfers, because they will acquire their 
securities at a discounted price in a well-functioning, well-informed market.
There are, however, a number of reasons why I believe price-adjusting 
mechanism in this particular arena would not survive a careful analysis. 
First, one should note that the accuracy of the market rationale hinges on the 
timing of a company’s life cycle and its decision to cross-list, as well as the 
investor’s own time horizon. Consider the Aracruz and Sadia cases, in which 
the cross-listing decision was made after many investors had already acquired 
securities in Brazilian market public offerings. These “first acquirers” long-
term investors would not expect to lose future value due to legal risks assumed 
law firms regarding claims of non-U.S. investors that can no longer be 
asserted in U.S. courts.
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in a foreign jurisdiction, precisely because they could not have anticipated 
with any certainty that the firms in which they were investing would later 
cross-list in the United States. 
Second, if the legal-bonding hypothesis — before Morrison — justified 
the cross-listing premium associated with listing in the U.S. market, those 
investors who acquired shares after the cross-listing announcement would 
have paid a higher premium because they would have expected to enjoy better 
legal protection from investing in a U.S. cross-listed company.149 However, 
post-Morrison they enjoy exactly the same deficient level of legal protection 
of a non-cross-listed company investor.150 
Third, price-adjusting arguments assume efficient capital markets. But, 
empirical studies that have tried to measure the efficiency of several capital 
149 In other words, even if they were aware of the flaws of the Brazilian law, they 
counted on the U.S. laws to protect them as a result of the cross-listing, and for 
this reason paid more for the shares of cross-listed companies. In this situation, 
long-term first investors may have enjoyed the cross-listing premium afterwards, 
which could hypothetically work as a functional equivalent to a risk-premium for 
the possibility that a cross-listing could entail a wealth transfer to U.S. investors 
from securities litigation. Under this reasoning, in order to place a value on the 
wealth transfer one could try to estimate the unconditional probability that there 
would be loss from securities fraud, multiplied by the lost value, and compare 
it to an estimate of the higher valuation of the company’s shares traded on the 
Brazilian market as a result of the cross-listing before the loss. I am grateful to 
Roberta Romano for pointing out this measurement possibility. However, even 
the supposed cross-listing risk-premium does not solve the ex post distributional 
problem with respect to the holders of the securities suffering from the double 
circularity problem. Imagine, for example, that all other things equal, two investors 
buy securities on different days enjoying exactly the same risk-premium for 
potential losses due to securities fraud and lack of compensation in their home 
country. Then consider that a securities fraud is afterwards revealed, showing 
inflation in the price paid by only the second investor. This leaves the second 
investor worse off than the first, because the former will actually bear the impact 
of the harm due to the price inflation while the latter, although enjoying a risk-
premium, was not in practice affected by the inflation. The price adjusting, which 
both investors relied on ex ante, does not address practical ex post economic 
distributional and fairness effects emerging from the securities fraud.
150 It is still unclear the effect that Morrison produced on the supposed premium of 
cross-listed companies. See supra note 124 for studies analyzing the effects of 
Morrison on share price of cross-listed companies. A possible hypothesis is that 
Morrison will dissipate or considerably diminish the legal bonding associated 
with a U.S. cross listing. If the premium persists, reputational bonding, and 
factors other than legal bonding per se may then explain it. See supra note 105.
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markets around the world have rejected the efficiency hypothesis in the strong 
or semi-strong forms — which could fully account for a discount in the price 
due to a perception of future distributional losses.151 Therefore there is large 
support for the view that markets do not operate flawlessly — otherwise why 
would we need securities regulation at all? As long as one acknowledges 
there are market failures and externalities effects, there is room for regulation 
aiming to correct or at least diminish those problems.
Fourth, the same market-based objections to the double circularity problem 
could be similarly raised with respect to the circularity problem. Why isn’t all 
securities litigation abolished on the grounds that securities frauds are resolved 
by the ex-ante market pricing mechanism? We could envision a no-law world 
in which all investors discount for all fraud possibilities, with no regulation or 
litigation to protect investments and provide recovery for fraud-related losses. 
Allegedly by discounting the price of securities ex ante, U.S. investors, as 
foreign investors, would also be perfectly protected. Nonetheless, this is not 
the world in which we now live.152 
Fifth, general price discounting may ultimately result in securities prices 
so low for all issuers that investors will not be able to distinguish good 
companies from bad. This could lead to a market-for-lemons problem153 and 
ultimately lock the market into a low level equilibrium that is not conducive 
to economic development. Reputational issuers may be driven out of capital 
markets to look for alternative sources of finance. 
Therefore, a case can be made that transnational wealth transfer problems 
are unlikely to be dissipated by pure market functioning. In this sense, this 
151 See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 am. econ. Rev. 393 (1980); Barr Rosenberg, 
Kenneth Reid & Ronald Lanstein, Persuasive Evidence of Market Inefficiency, 
11 J. PoRtFolio mGmt. 3, 9 (1985); Meredith Beechey, David William Gruen 
& James Vickery, The Efficient Market Hypothesis: A Survey (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Research Discussion Paper, 2000), available at http://www.rba.gov.
au/publications/rdp/2000/pdf/rdp2000-01.pdf; see also ÉRica GoRGa, diReito 
societáRio atual [contemPoRaRy coRPoRate law] 83-85 (2013) (reviewing 
studies on the efficiency of Brazilian capital markets and showing that most of 
them display efficiency in the weak form or lack efficiency). Strong, semi-strong 
and weak are forms of market efficiency. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970).
152 Further, if we learned anything from the 2008 financial crisis and the others that 
came before it, it is that leaving the markets free to operate by themselves will 
not necessarily produce the best world for investors.
153 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. econ. 488 (1970).
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Article questions whether the current national regulatory and enforcement 
systems based on contrasting legal responses for holders of similar securities 
— with equivalent economic rights — who suffered from the same factual 
wrongdoing make sense for a transnational securities market increasingly 
globalized and interdependent. In this context, the next Part discusses regulatory 
proposals to fix such distributional imbalances.
IV. reform consIderatIons
Morrison’s geographic transactional test was also motivated by the Supreme 
Court’s intention to diminish political tensions with other countries.154 Yet this 
Article shows that this test has resulted in severe economic tensions among 
investors of the same issuer, raising serious concerns about international 
economic fairness. The integration of transnational securities markets requires 
coping not only with political conflicts of legal jurisdiction, but also with 
problems of wealth distribution among similar investors of the same issuer. 
While this Article does not attempt to develop a broad new regulatory proposal, 
this Part reviews reform proposals advanced by the literature with the purpose 
of determining which might solve the problem of wealth transfers from foreign 
to U.S. investors.
A. U.S.-Based Reforms
Some of the current reform recommendations would in fact worsen economic 
tensions. For instance, if the U.S. Congress maintained Morrison’s ban on 
f-cubed litigation and expanded antifraud claims against foreign issuers for 
American investors acquiring securities in other jurisdictions (f-squared 
complaints), as some current proposals contemplate,155 wealth transfer effects 
between American investors and foreign investors would tend to increase. In 
addition to the transactional criterion determined by Morrison, this proposal 
would introduce a nationality bias that would further aggravate the imbalance. 
This Article therefore cautions against the adoption of such proposals.
The distributional problems created by the exceptional nature of the U.S. 
regulatory framework can only be solved by providing equal regulatory 
154 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885-86 (2010) (referring 
to the amicus curiae briefs of the United Kingdom, Australia and France and 
stating that the rule adopted by the Court meets other countries’ concerns that 
the reach of the antifraud provisions can interfere with their own regimes of 
securities regulation); Fox, supra note 80, at 1271.
155 See supra notes 111-112, 114-115 and accompanying text.
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treatment for U.S. and foreign investors. Theoretically, this could be achieved 
by uniformity in the U.S. regulatory approach, either in a negative (abstention) 
or positive (extensive) way. The negative approach would mean that the United 
States abstains from applying its securities regulation to foreign issuers in all 
possible complaints — including the claims brought by American investors who 
acquired cross-listed securities on the U.S. stock exchanges and markets. This 
proposal has been endorsed by scholars such as Fox.156 The positive approach 
would mean that the United States extends the securities laws protection that 
its domestic investors enjoy to foreign investors as well.157
Both theoretical possibilities would require overturning Morrison. The 
negative approach would implicitly transfer jurisdiction of securities laws 
rights relative to U.S. investors acquiring securities from foreign companies 
to their foreign home countries. The positive approach, in contrast, would 
extend the extraterritorial effects of U.S. securities laws to foreign investors 
and include a complete acceptance of f-cubed claims in the United States. 
But this approach would also require changing the type of pre-Morrison 
inquiries based on the conduct and effects tests,158 as well as prerequisites for 
class certification,159 as maintaining these tests and restrictions could lead to 
the double circularity problem explained above whenever foreign investors 
have their claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (either by 
conduct or effect) or of superiority requirement.160
156 Fox, supra note 80, at 1205, 1272-73. Fox analyzes policy justifications for 
U.S. fraud on the market claims, but concludes that such claims “should not be 
imposed on genuinely foreign issuers, even if the claimants are U.S. residents 
or have effected their purchases on U.S. markets.” Id. at 1205. Fox’s proposal 
is appealing in the sense that it attacks the distributional problem at its roots. If 
buyers who engaged in transactions in the U.S. markets lack a cause of action 
to file claims against foreign issuers, the wealth transfers discussed above are 
precluded. He admits, however, an exception to this general rule when a foreign 
issuer voluntarily abides by the U.S. liability regime, a reform possibility that 
I address below.
157 The SEC proposal discussed supra note 125 and accompanying text supports 
this view.
158 See supra notes 89, 90-91 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 87-88 and uccompanying text. 
160 These reforms would also rely to some extent on the consent of foreign jurisdictions 
in enforcing class action decisions and settlements against foreign corporations, 
which would trigger the recognition problems discussed supra notes 87-88 and 
accompanying text. See also Mulheron, supra note 146, at 445-46 (discussing 
the non-recognition risk factor).
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:08 PM
176 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 16:131
B. Foreign-Based Reforms
Another distinct alternative is to rely instead on the future development 
of securities antifraud litigation in international jurisdictions to fix present 
imbalances. Peta Spender and Michael Tarlowski have suggested that Morrison 
will produce a “centrifugal effect” on transnational securities litigation.161 
In this view, securities class actions would flow to other jurisdictions that 
adopted “opt out procedures” such as those used in Australia. Nevertheless, 
many potential barriers to this alternative exist. Most countries currently lack 
the legal mechanisms and economic incentives that make possible effective 
capital markets aggregate litigation.162 As an example, Spender and Tarlowski 
themselves point out that Australia’s legal environment lacks contingency 
fees and types of punitive damages, and uses the loser-pays rule.163 I believe 
these very characteristics may not be conducive to the filing of class actions. 
If, according to this view, Morrison could catalyze regulatory reform in 
other countries,164 one might have expected that the Sadia and Aracruz cases 
would have exerted competitive pressure on Brazilian regulators to maximize 
the welfare of Brazilian investors, and to pass legislation that would protect 
their interests, allowing new enforcement actions that enable direct financial 
recovery. Nonetheless, nothing has developed in this direction in Brazil so 
far.165 Hence, this laissez-faire approach is unlikely to cure current flaws, 
especially in consideration of the fact that path dependency usually impairs 
significant legal changes.166
Hannah Buxbaum has discussed whether foreign investors could find a 
route to recovery in the United States independent of the application of U.S. 
161 Peta Spender & Michael Tarlowski, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
Adventures on the Barbary Coast: Morrison and Enforcement in a Globalised 
Securities Market, 35 melbouRne. u. l. Rev. 280, 314 (2011). 
162 See supra note 146.
163 Spender & Tarlowski, supra note 161, at 314. 
164 See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 ohio st. l.J. 537, 
570 (2011) (further arguing that Morrison has the potential to encourage greater 
international cooperation to cope with transnational securities fraud); see also 
Choi & Silberman, supra note 25, at 501. 
165 See generally Érica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study 
of Brazil, 27 u. Pa. J. int’l econ. l. 803 (2006) (discussing problems for law 
reforms in Brazilian capital markets).
166 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence 
in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 stan. l. Rev. 127 (1999). 
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securities laws.167 One possibility would be to rely on claims arising under 
foreign securities law. However, procedural obstacles such as establishing subject 
matter jurisdiction, avoiding dismissal based on forum non conveniens, and 
meeting class certification provide multiple bases on which a U.S. court could 
decline jurisdiction.168 This alternative depends on the judgment of U.S. courts, 
which tend to be reluctant to apply foreign securities law.169 This reluctance 
aside, even if foreign investors could rely on U.S. courts to apply foreign 
securities law to solve antifraud cases, such application may be insufficient, 
precisely because of the laxer legal standards for investor protection in many 
other countries.170 As a practical matter, foreign investors are unlikely to obtain 
financial recovery in the United States under foreign securities law claims that 
could minimize the wealth transfers to U.S. investors that they currently bear. 
C. Private Ordering Reforms Based on Issuer and Investor Choices
Other set of regulatory reforms seem to enable all investors of the same 
corporation who were subjected to losses caused by the same wrongdoing to 
obtain the same litigation outcome — and the same financial recovery, if any.
Roberta Romano has proposed that issuers and investors choose their 
regulatory regimes independent of firm or investor residence and the location 
of the securities transaction. Such an approach “reduces the possibility that 
a regulator will be able to transfer wealth across different regulated entities 
or redistribute wealth from the regulated sector to preferred individuals 
167 Buxbaum, supra note 100, at 173.
168 Id. at 175-78. Buxbaum also explores the possibility of relying on recovery 
through mechanisms of public enforcement, which “may be more capable 
than private enforcement of successful integration into the overall scheme of 
international securities regulation.” Yet, she points out that the SEC may have 
a policy restriction on which cases to pursue. Id. at 185. Empirical research has 
indeed shown that the enforcement actions against foreign issuers by the SEC 
are very limited when compared to domestic issuers. See Shnitser, supra note 
105; Siegel, supra note 105.
169 Buxbaum, supra note 100, at 183 (“[T]he prospects for asserting claims arising 
out of foreign transactions on the basis of foreign governing law seem slim.”).
170 See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text. See generally Simeon Djankov, 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. Fin. econ. 430, 461 (2008) (finding that 
common law countries outperform civil law countries in an index of shareholder 
protection against self-dealing transactions in seventy-two countries, which 
implicitly suggests U.S. superiority).
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or organizations.”171 She has proposed that issuers disclose the relevant 
securities regime governing their transactions and that investors approve 
any regime changes. In addition, local judiciaries would have to recognize 
forum selection for the resolution of private securities lawsuits — including 
arbitration. Alternatively, exchanges could demand as a listing requirement 
the disclosure of domicile and, therefore, of litigation forum.172 By making the 
choice of law applicable to all securities holders, Romano’s “issuer choice” 
proposal avoids distributional problems, since all securities holders would 
receive equal treatment, whether or not they qualify for an indemnification.
Wolf-Georg Ringe and Alexander Hellgardt have proposed bundling 
securities liability and disclosure duties under the same applicable law for 
all issuers, regardless of the precise market place of the transaction or the 
nationality or residence of a harmed investor. They defend the use of the 
lex incorporationis, under which an investor can reliably learn which rules 
apply to an issuer.173 Liability of cross-listed firms should also be governed 
by a disclosure regime, and when an issuer is voluntarily subject to more 
than one disclosure regime, harmed investors may choose the liability rules, 
independent of their nationality or place of securities acquisition. According 
to this rationale, all investors will be able to enjoy stricter liability rules 
from the cross-listing jurisdiction, and therefore should be allowed to sue 
for damages under U.S. law.174 This proposal provides the choice of law to 
investors, and therefore may solve the wealth transfer problem if investors 
are able to choose jurisdictions that better protect their interests.
Therefore if issuers could voluntarily subject themselves to one particular 
antifraud regime to regulate their transactions in all jurisdictions in which they 
list their securities,175 investors would receive the same legal response to the 
171 Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 
2 theoRetical inQuiRies l. 1, 6-7 (2001). 
172 Id. at 15.
173 Wolf-Georg Ringe & Alexander Hellgardt, The International Dimension of Issuer 
Liability — Liability and Choice of Law from a Transatlantic Perspective, 31 
oxFoRd J. leGal stud. 23, 50-51 (2011); id. at 56 (“Those issuers that most 
adhere to U.S. disclosure duties should consequently be liable under U.S. fraud 
rules when they violate those duties, no matter where a transaction takes place 
or a certain investor is located.”).
174 Id. at 56-57.
175 Fox, supra note 80, at 1213 (putting forward a proposal along the same lines in 
the U.S. domestic market, and arguing that “foreign issuers that choose to be 
subject to U.S. fraud-on-the-market class actions will be liable to all purchasers, 
wherever resident and wherever they purchased their shares, to the same extent 
that a U.S. issuer would be in an entirely domestic context”).
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same complaints independent of the place of the transaction. Along the same 
lines, involuntary transfers of capital would be precluded if investors were 
allowed to choose the litigation venue in which they bring their claims. While 
I do not attempt to address the challenges of implementation, such policies 
would guarantee that securities holders of the same issuers receive a pro rata 
distribution of corporate compensation in the case of shareholder recovery, 
thus assuring fairness and an efficient distribution of corporate resources.176
Having analyzed a variety of proposals, this Article endorses those that 
provide for a system of adjudication of transnational securities litigation 
producing equal treatment for securities holders subject to the same wrongdoing 
regardless of the nationality of the purchasers or the location of purchase/
sale. This result would be best achieved through issuer or investor choice of 
applicable legal regime. These approaches would ensure that investors who 
acquired similar securities face company-specific risks instead of pure legal 
risks, diminishing the ability of companies to engage in legal arbitrage at the 
expense of a specific group of security holders. Another advantage of this 
proposal is that it enables economies of scale at the international level,177 as a 
transnational regime of adjudication would save on the costs associated with 
differing applicable legal regimes and litigation in multiple forums.
While I do not attempt here to provide all details of implementation, some 
possible strategies could include a supranational securities regulator with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate transnational securities litigation and guarantee 
uniform treatment of investors who hold securities of the same companies. 
One could also think of private ordering solutions by which corporations could 
choose to solve all their legal disputes in particular jurisdictions or subject 
themselves to arbitration clauses that provide equivalent legal remedies to 
equivalent securities holders. States, accordingly, would have to cede their 
jurisdiction to legitimize such arrangements. Corporate governance codes of 
best practices and stock exchange listing rules could also promote or require 
that all investors be treated equally in transnational securities litigation so as 
to avoid the double circularity problem.
conclusIon
This Article has analyzed private enforcement actions brought against Brazilian 
corporations in the United States and in Brazil for the same kind of corporate 
misconduct. This scenario allows an unprecedented comparative inquiry 
176 Id. at 1217.
177 Id. at 1220.
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into legal approaches to securities frauds and their legal outcomes in these 
two different jurisdictions. While U.S. investors were able to directly obtain 
financial recovery in class action settlements, Brazilian investors lacked the 
legal mechanisms necessary for seeking direct compensation. Additionally, 
Brazilian investors bore the costs of the compensation paid to U.S. investors. 
The small cash recovery produced by the Brazilian derivative suit in the 
Aracruz case resulted in indirect benefits to both Brazilian and U.S. investors.
My analysis therefore reveals wealth transfers from foreign to U.S. investors 
in the current system of transnational securities litigation, which are effected 
by contrasting private enforcement mechanisms producing different outcomes. 
The Article also argues that the Morrison decision has aggravated such 
distributional problems, and sheds light on the costs Morrison has imposed 
on foreign investors. As foreign jurisdictions tend to be significantly less 
protective of investor interests than the United States — as demonstrated by 
the Sadia and Aracruz cases — U.S. investors tend to receive non pro rata 
compensation despite holding similar economic rights to those of foreign 
investors. Moreover, foreign investors also support the costs associated with 
such U.S. investors’ recoveries. The Article has identified a “double circularity 
problem,” so far neglected by policymakers and scholarship, which stems 
from the fact that the very foreign shareholders who were harmed by the 
securities fraud may also bear the costs of the recoveries achieved by U.S. 
investors. This problem therefore casts serious doubt on the welfare of the 
current system of international securities litigation, producing allocation and 
fairness problems in globalized securities markets.
Having revealed such a flaw in the current system, the Article then surveyed 
existing reform proposals for fixing transnational securities litigation. Some 
reform proposals aggravate or ignore this problem, while others mitigate it. 
The Article endorsed proposals that allow the implementation of a uniform 
system for the adjudication of transnational securities litigation for all securities 
holders of the same company. Systems of issuer or investor choice would better 
promote an efficient allocation of remedies as well as legal and economic 
fairness in international markets.
The Article has also discussed other possible solutions based on U.S. 
or foreign jurisdictions reforms. A U.S. solution would require overturning 
Morrison. In addition, it would demand either the abstention of U.S. securities 
law jurisdiction from U.S. acquirers of securities of foreign issuers or an 
extension of extraterritorial effects of U.S. securities law to all foreign investors. 
In contrast, foreign solutions would require reforms that create and implement 
the legal infrastructure necessary to provide direct recovery mechanisms to 
foreign investors groups so as to protect them against losses due to securities 
fraud. The practical limitations of these approaches were acknowledged. 
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Fixing the problem with transnational securities litigation will improve 
international corporate governance. It will avoid a scenario in which only 
a portion of investors support the costs of corporate governance failures 
and instead provide that securities holders obtain equivalent loss remedies. 
A broad range of solutions can be envisioned, including a supranational 
securities regulator, stock exchange listing requirements, choice of litigation 
forum, and arbitration clauses that enable the adjudication of transnational 
securities lawsuits in a coherent way to all harmed securities holders. Corporate 
governance codes of best practices could also push for equalitarian treatment 
of investors in transnational securities litigation so as to prevent the double 
circularity problem.
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